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Parliamentarians take action 
for East Tim or 
Parliamentarians from the UK, Australia and Japan have 
agreed to launch a new organisatioo, Parliament:arlans 
for Bast Timor to coordinate and promote activities in 
support of a just solutioo to the problem of East Timor 
in as many countries as possible. 
The decision came at tre end of a three-day visit to 
Lisbon from 25-28 June by Lord Avebury, chair of the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group in the UK, Tony Lamb, 
Member of the House of Representatives and oonvenor of 
the Parliamentary East Timor Forum, Canberra, and Eda 
satsuki, member of the Japanese Diet and secretary of 
the Japanese Forum of Parliamentarians to think abrut 
East Timor. 
During the visi~ the three parliamentarians held 
discussions with members of the East Timor oommunity, 
with represart:ati.ves oftre East Timor Convergence, Jose 
Ramos Horta of Fret:ilinarrl Dr. Moises do Ama:cal of UDT, 
and with Mario Soares, the President of Portugal, the 
Deputy Foreign Minister, the Speak.er of the Portllguese 
Parliament and nine members of the Parliamentary 
Commission on East Timor. 
In a statemen~ the parliamentarians said they had 
heard again "recent e1Tidence of killings, torture, 
disappearance arrl rape. Contrary to the view elepressed 
by some governments, human rights violations are still 
very serious. Foreign visitors get a distorted picture 
thrcugh the use of careful stage management." 
They armounced a number of initiatives including tre 
publication of en account of the Ind:>nesian invasioo and 
annexation of East Timor, an approach to the UN 
Secretary-General regarding oonsultations with the 
people of East Timor as required by General Assembly 
resolution 3 7 /3 0 of November 1982, a petition to the UN 
Deoolonisatioo Committee in August this year, a new 
request to the Ind::mesian authorities to allow 
parliamentarians to investigate human rights violations 
in East Timor, as well as representations to non-aligned 
countries to oppose Indonesia's bid to beoome president 
of the non-aligned movement. 
In conclusion, the parliamentarians said: "We are 
convinced that the realisation of a just solution for 
the question of East Timor, based on the principle of 
self-determinatiai, is essential not only for the sake 
of tre people of East Timor themselves, but for the 
whole of mankind. If acts of aggression are oondooed and 
the transfer of territory by military force is 
acceptable, world peace can never be assured." -{( 
President Soares speaks out in Manila 
Mario Soares, the President of Portugal, used a visit to 
Manila, where he attended a cooference of states 
recently restored to democracy, to declare yet again 
that "Portugal centimes to fight intematiooally for 
the inalienable right of the martyred people of East 
Timortotheirindaperrlenoe." He also attacked Indonesia 
for halting the deoolonisation process in East Timor. 
Making such a statement in the heartlarrl of ASE AN was 
particularly galling to Jakarta. Ali Alatas accused 
Soares of "distorting history'' and complained that he 
had made use of such a forum to make statements about 
East Timor [Jakarta Post, 8 June]. 
Commenting on the Alatas' response, President Soares 
called it "a C}'.xxi sign" because it shows that Incbnesia 
is sensitive to what others say. [Exp~ Lisbon, 10 
June] 1f 
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EASTTIMOR 
Carrascalao wants 
East Timor opened up 
A statement by Mario Carrascalao, governor of East 
Timor, that he has asked President Suharto to declare 
East Timor an "q>en province" [Jakarta Post, 20 J\llle 
198) in order to acccelerate the pace of development., 
has drawn attention to the fact that entry into East 
Timor is ooly ix>ssible with a 'clearance OOcllment' from 
the security authorities. C arrascalao later made it 
clear that he wa~ not suggesting q>ening East Timor up 
toforeigners [~ Pembaruan, 24 June 1988). Even so, 
one newspaper suggested that the idea would help ''to 
neutralise critics oo international forums" [Kompas, 28 
JW'le), oo doubt with an eye particularly oo Ind::>nesia's 
bid to occupy the presidency of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, after the meeting of the foreign ministers of 
the Movement in Cyprus in September. 
The first tocommenton Carrascalao's suggestion was 
Mini.sb!r of the Interior, General Rudini who said that 
as far as his Department was concerned, "there is no 
problem though it all depends on the judgment of the 
armed forces" [ Jtompas, 21 JW'le). But Foreign Minister 
AU Alatas, woo has said on numerous occasions that 
foreign visitors wishinj to carry out investigations 
would not be welcome, now claimed that it was only 
"physical oonstraints" such as lack of transportation 
that obstructed foreign visits" [Jakarta Post, 24 June). 
The next to comment was Admiral Sudomo, Ministe~ 
Coordinator f6r Political and Security, woo cootradicted 
AU Alatas by say.l.ng that "the necessary infrastructllre 
of roads and other facilities already exist ••• so there 
is no problem". General Try Sutrisno, armed forces 
commander-Jn-chief, acblallydeniedthat East Timor was 
closed. "The region is open just like other prcwi.nces 
but because it is a young province, it still requires 
attention." [Korn~ 29 June) Apparently, he thinks that 
because he can go in and out of East Timor as he 
pleases, this means that it is q>en to everyale else! 
Butthisa~ofcxnsensus was spiked by General 
Murdcl'li. M.inisterof Defenc:ler who more than anyone knows 
the sitllation in East Timor. In his woids, any proposal 
to open up East Timor "needs careful consideratioo •••• 
If the governor thinks the time has come, his idea can 
be discussed with the annedforoescommander-in-chief." 
But he added that "if anvthing happens", the governor 
shoo.id not then oold tfie armed forces respoosible 
[ltompas, 28 June). This forced Carrascalao to retreat., 
saying that East Timor ccW.d not be opened up if the 
security forces then "abarrlon us" [Tempo, 2 July 1988]. 
Indonesians are stealing our jobs 
So what is it that prompted Carrascalao to call for an 
cpen1ng up? An interview reveals that his main worry is 
that the scyle of development in East Timor is depriving 
East T:iloorese d pbs cnd causing Wlemployment. This is 
the result of the huge influx of !OOooesians into the 
territory, yet paradClld.cally, his prq>e>sal, if accepted, 
would only accelerate this influx. So what is he after? 
"To say that East Timor is cla;ed is a mere formality. 
Many people from outside do come in because they have 
The almost-completed officiaJ residence of Goveroor 
Carrascalao. The cost: Rp. 359,400,000. 
.Jakarta Pas~ 20 May 1988 
the right connections. Many petty traders come, 
especially from East Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi am 
Butal. 'Ibey don't create jobs. On the contrary, they 
'snatch' jobs from the local inhabitants. On the ooe 
harrl, it is good to close the province to protect East 
Timorese who are not yet ready to compete with people 
from outside. But if it continues, the crisis will 
become unmanagable." 
So, who OOe.s he think soould be encouraged to come? 
"Private capital that creates jobs.... There is some 
private capital in East Timor at present but they d::>n't 
invest capital. They only chase profits by working on 
government projects: then they take their profits and 
run, investing nothing, so there is no job creation. 
They even bring their own stone-carriers with them." 
But would ootopening up East Timor mean more small 
traders coming in and snatdling jobs from the Timorese? 
"Yes, but with East Timor closed, prices can be three 
or four times highel" than in Jakarta. If it were q>ened 
up, there would be competitim and... everyone, 
including the Timorese, wruld get a share." 
So, when shoo.id it be opened up? 
"Now, provided close collaboration with the armed 
forces is preserved Let it rtt not happen that because 
the provincial c;pvernment feels ready, the security 
forces aband::>n us. If this collaboration were to be 
aband::>ned, it would mean that the situation is not }'et 
ready." [Tempo, 2 July 1988] 
So, Carrascala::> knows he cannot move an inch as long 
as the security problem lasts. Despite all the fuss 
about opening up, it is clear that nothing will change. 
Unemployment on the increase 
Official statistics showing a sharp increase in the 
number of memployed peq>le in East Timor have been 
criticised by Governor Carrascalao as W'lderstating the 
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extent of the problem. The statistics show that trere 
were 7,616 peq>le wit:hootjobs in 1986-87, of woom less 
than c:ne per cent were found placements. The previous 
year, 4,590 were without jobs, of whom nearly 30 per 
cent were found placements. 
But according to Carrascalao, the real figure is far 
higher. "Government administraticn at lower levels in 
EASTTIMOR 
the villages is not functioning, with the result that 
tie majority of people witb:>ut jobs have not been 
registered" [ Kompas, 29 June]. {c 
Human rights abuses in 1985 and 1986 
Information abwt.al:Al.ses i;erpetrated in East Timor takes 
months and even years to reach the outside world. There 
is a total blackout of news from the territory~ all 
information about arrests, tortllre, disappearances and 
extra-judicial killings is sent out by sources that must 
be treated as "clandestine". Though the names of the 
informants are kmwn, they may not be identified. 
In February 1985, the UN Commissicn on Human Rights, 
which had fur years been considering East Tirnor wrler 
its 1503 (confidential) procedure, decided to remove 
East Timor from its agenda. The reason given was that 
the Indonesian Government had reported that the human 
rights sitnatioo had improved and that it was willing to 
collaborate with humanitarian organisations. 
The Indcnesian Government has never furnished any 
infor:mation abcut the number of people arrested, save in 
one single mat.ten it has been very eager to provide 
detailed lists of pEq>le who were tried in Dill in 1985, 
1986 and early 1987. As we have shown [ TAPOL Bulletin, 
No 86, April 1988), these were show-trials staged quite 
deliberately to deceive the intematiooal community 
(including the Human Rights Commissioo) into believing 
that all peq>le cEta:ined in East 'fimor were enjoying due 
process of the law. 
Photo by Elaine Briere 
Yet even as this deception was being perpetrated, 
human rights violations cootinued unabated. The 
communicatioos blackout means that only now is it 
possible to compile and analyse what was really going on 
in 1985 and 1986. With the territory still closed to 
independent observation, we will probably hcue to wait 
until 1990 to k:row what is happening there at present. 
The Lisbon-based organisation, Peace is Possible in 
East Timor, has painstakingly compiled and analysed 
information that has reached Lis boo in the last year or 
so about violations during 1985 and 1986. It has 
published a list of 439 names of people arrested, 
tortllred, injured, raped, executed or reported to have 
disappeared during tlose years. A number of names 
represent incidents in which several persons or a large 
grcnp of peq;>le were subjected to the abuse in question 
tb:>ugh only a single name is available. Taking these 
graip cases into accolDlt. Peace is Possible concludes 
that the list represents 1,024 victims. 
It would be unrealistic to assume that the list is 
anything like complete. Take for instance the list of 
persons brought to trial, which was furnished by the 
Indonesian authorities. This included 198 prisoners. Of 
these, 46 names had been received from "clandestine" 
sources. Thus, these sources provided information 
regaJ:ding ooly one in fuur of the peq>le who tllrned out 
to have been in detention and brought to trial in Dill. 
If this ratio is any guide, it would mean that :in 1985 
and 1986, there were likely to have been around 4,000 
victims, not 1,024 as the list suggests. 
The Peace is Possible list is very detailed. It 
includes the sex and age of the victim, the date of the 
occurrence, the army unit responsible, tie locality arrl 
the treatment. 95 are listed simply as having _ been_ 
arrested, 245 suffered tortllre and mal-treatment. A 
total of 28 women, more than half the women on the list. 
were rapd 52 pers::ns were murdered and 24 disappeared. 
The Int:ernatiooal Red Cross CICRC) has had access only 
to the 46 pers:>ns en the list who were tried: all the 
rest have been beyond the reach of I CR C protection. 
As Peace is Possible recognises, it is quite 
understandable for humanitarian and even human rights 
organisations to require more recent and more precise 
information for the purposes of action. But such 
requirements can never been met as long as there is a 
total blackout on news from East Timor. The degree of 
violence still being sustained in 1985 and 1986, after 
ten years of occupation, means that it is neither 
occasional nor fortuitous. There is a generalised state 
of violence that threatens the e>d.stence of an entire 
people. 
Depo Provera widely used in East Timor 
D epo Provera, the ccntrovers.ial oontraceptive injection, 
is the most widely-used contraception in East Timor's 
state-IUl birth control programme. More than half of the 
couples participating in the family planning programme 
in East Timor in 1986 were using this injection. 
This fact emerges from documents provided by the 
Indooesian Family Planning Associatim in response to 
~es by the Internaticnal Plarmed Parenth:>od. 
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Assod..at.1on after a Eurq:>ean meeting of Family Planning 
Associatioos in Londoo in 1986 heard complaints aboot 
birth oontrol in East Timor. 
Ind:>nesia's high-profile family planning programme is 
official! y justified in terms of the high pqmlation 
density in some parts of the country, notably in Java 
which, with ooly 6.4 per cent of the land territory, has 
more than 60 per cent of the populati.oo. Such 
considerations are gra.mdless in East Timor where 
population density has always been low aOO. where nearly 
one third of the population have died as the result of 
war, disease, famine and atrocities that have plagued 
East Timor since it was invaded in December 1975. 
Programme condemned in the US 
In March 1987, the us Cath:>lic Bishops' Conference 
drew attention to reports of forced birth control in 
East Timor and said that "given the great loss of life 
that has already taken place amoog a largely Catholic 
people, this Indooesian policy takes on the character of 
gen::>cide". In a letter to Secretary of State George 
Sclultz in J\lly 1987, forty US senators were concerned 
that "Imonesia's World Bank-furxled population cootrol 
programme in East Timor is ooercive .••• Given the sharp 
reduction of East Timor's population over the past 
eleven years and the fact that the territory was tmder-
populated prior to the Incbn:!sian invasion, what is the 
justification fi:>r population control programmes there?'' 
In its reply to the IPPF, the Indonesian Family 
Plannin;J Assoc:i.at:ion ga.1Te ncthlng away about abuses and 
ooercion, but it provided figures showing that, even 
though population dens.tt:y in East Timor is 30 persons 
per square kilometre as compared with 700 per square 
kilometre in Java, the family planning prog:ramme is far 
more intensively practised in East Timor than in 
Indcnesia as a whole. The figures supplied to the IPPF 
soow that in East T imor: 
* the gcwernment sperrls more than twice the amount it 
spends in Ind:>D:!Sia as a woole per couple of fertile 
age; 
* it spends five times the amount it spends in 
Indcnesia per couple using birth oontrol; 
* there is a higher proportion of family planning 
personn:!l to the number of fertile rouples - 7 3 per cent 
in East Timor as compared to 53 per cmt in Indooesia; 
* far fewer meetings (c:nly a quarter of the number in 
Indonesia) for public informat:kn on family planning are 
held in East Timor fewer visits (only two-sevenths) are 
made to community
1
leaders am far fewer visits to homes 
(only one-fifteenth). 
These figures soow that Irrlonesia devotes more money 
and personrel to family planning in East Timor than 
elsewhere but spends far less effort to spreading 
information on the basis of which people might be 
expected to join the programme of their own free will. 
The cootraceptives used further reinforce the 
impression that there is a high degree of coercion in 
East Timor: 
* In 1986, 57 per cent of current users were using 
the Depo Prcwera inject:ial, 29 per cent were using the 
Pill and 10 per cent were using IUDs. 
Not satisfied with the information supplied by the 
Indonesian family planning body, the IPPF has made 
further inquiries. {r 
Inter-Parliamentary Union resolution 
We have recently obtained a oopy of the resolution 
i:eganlin;J East Timor, cd:>pt:ed by the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union at its oonference in Bangkok last October. East 
Timor is mentioned as part of a oompadte resolution on 
pressing fur implementation of UN resolution 1514 on 
granting imepemence to colonial countries. One of the 
many introdoct:ory points of the resolution is: 
"Considerlng that the siblation in East Timor gives 
rise to concern," 
Point 46 of the substantive part of the resolutioo 
follows this concern through, and reads: 
"Invites the parties roncerned by the East Timor 
question to work _1::0<Jet:her with the United Nations 
Secretary-General to fin~ as soon as possible, a 
solution in the interest of the population of that 
territory, according to the principle of self-
determination." 
The oomposite resolution was aoopted by 791 \Otes to 
122, with 207 abstentions. {c 
• 
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Ex-prisoners as social pariahs 
The wave of persecution against former political 
prisoners and alleged members or sympathisers of the 
Indcnesian Communist Party (PK I) has recently further 
intensified. 
The current campaign against the 'latent danger of the 
PK I' appears to have been prompted by claims of several 
retired generals, including the former red-beret 
commander, Sarwo Echie, alleging PK! infiltration at the 
most senior levels of state power. [See TAPOL Bulletin, 
No. 87, June 1988]. Such statements oontinue to appear, 
alcng withm.nnerrus anti-oommunistarticles and reports, 
in Jayakarta, the newspaper formerly owned by the 
Jakarta Military Command and now controlled by retired 
army officers. Other newspapers have joined in. The 
campaign is directed against Vice-President Sudharmooo 
and several of his closest aides but it has also led to 
new measures against former political prisoners. 
The newspaper campaign wert too far in the view of the 
government b~ .instead of closing the paper oown, there 
are signs thatJayakarta's owners will be forced to sell 
o~ most likely to functionaries of FltPPI, the 
organisation for sons and daughters of retirees and 
members of the anned forces, an arganisation of growing 
political and eoonomic importance. 
The Jayakartacamprlgn led Admiral Sudomo, the newly-
appointed Minister-Coorclinator for Political and 
Security Affairs, to proclaim that unsubstantiated 
charges about PK! infiltration should not be bandied 
about .in the press but soould be reported "in the proper 
way" to K opcamtib. 9.ldan o who, before 1983 was himself 
commander of Kopkamtib, hastened to add that all B-
Category ex-prisoners (who could not be tried for lack 
ofevidenoe butweredet:ainedfor many years) were wder 
close scrutiny by the security forces. Anyone suspicious 
of former prisoners sh:>uld report them immediately, he 
said [ Kompas, 29 April]. 
Then in June, Sudomo armounced that the serurity 
forces will re-examine the records of over half a 
million former political detainees. "The entire list 
will be re-checked, to see where they are now, what work 
they are ooing am what their present attibldes are." He 
alleged there were signs of P KI remnants trying to make 
a canebcck by w Iit:l.ng and publishing books, infiltrating 
organisatials, and be:::om.ing village lEcrls or businessmen 
[ltompas, 4 June]. Sudomo was evidently determined to 
take the .initiative of the latest anti-oomm\.U'rlst frenzy 
into his own hands and show that the security forces, 
which oow seem to be under his overall supervision, are 
as anti-communist as the likes of Sarwo Ed.hie. 
Alth:>ugh Suoomo's figure of half a million is a 
naticn-wide figu~ the military commander of East Java 
claimed, two months earlier, that in his province alcne, 
there are nearly half a million commwU.st suspects who 
must report to the security forces, including 57 A-
Category pecple, 4,455 B-Catecpry people, 22,117 c-
Categay people and a further 419,575 people woo oo not 
apparently have a category but who are nevertheless 
required to report [SUrabaya Post, 30 April]. 
Rumours of P_K I infiltration in the administraticn and 
the armed forces prompted Benny Murdani and Sudomo to 
describe such accusations as an insult. The presmt 
administration, they both .insist, is "clean". But Sudomo 
cdmits that"aboutl75.000 former PK! members" are still 
employed by the government in low-ranking ''non-
strategic" positicns. They will soon be sent into early 
retirement and replaced by new civil servants. 
From independent sources it would appear that the 
current wave of persecution pre-dates the Sarwo Edhie 
outbursts. Acoording to reports reaching TAPOL, the 
security forces in some parts of the oountry made their 
first moves agamstfonnerpriscners several mcnths acp 
wrenanumberoffonner A-Category prisoners, who were 
tried am sertenoed in the early 1970s and were released 
in the past few years, were subjected daily to long and 
gruelling int:errogaticn. In some places, interrogations 
began as Ieng aJO as mid-March and went on daily for 
several weeks. 
Tempo, 16 July 1988 
Many former p riscners also face the burden r:%. tighter 
"compulsory reporting'' (walap, or wajib lapor) 
requirements. Since General R udini. the Home Minister, 
instructed governors to "update the files of the e.x-
tapols", zealous civil servants all over the country 
have made life a misery for ex-prisoners. Monitoring e.x-
tapols starts at the lowest level in the neighbourh:xxl 
andresidmts' associations (RT/R W) in urban wards and 
rural villages. This is done at least monthly, while the 
seruriey bodies register them every three months. [Jawa 
Pos, 18 June 1988] 
Besides Catec;pri.es A arri B, there is the numerically 
much larger Catec;pry C, h.mdreds of tln.lsa00s of whom 
spent several years in detenticn after 1965. Acconling 
to a Jakarta weekly, Presidential Decree No 28 of 1975 
divided the C-category into three: Cl are th:>se 
allegedly 'i.m.ulved' .in the Madiun affair of 1948, C2 
are those who were 'ordinary' members of mass 
organisations banned in 1965 for allegedly being PKI 
affiliates, am C3 are those "sympathetic to the PKr' 
but with no clear (sic) role in the 1965 events. Cl 
people had to be discharged (and i.OOeed large numbers 
were impriscned) while C2 md C3 people were allowed to 
remain in their jobs "under guidance and supervisicn". 
[Editor, 13 June, quoted in Indonesia Hews Service, No 
114, July 4 1988]. In recent years, tlDusands of C2 and 
C3 pEq>le have been discharged or ordered to take early 
retirement. Now Sudomo is talking about getting rid of 
175,000 more people in these categories. ____,. 
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But trere is also an F-File frequently being mentimed 
in the current anti-communist wave. General R udini says 
this is a list of people active underground. He claims 
that the file disappeared, allegedly destroyed by the 
PK I, but security farces in the regions "are beginning 
to re-examine the file". [ Editor, 13 June] 
TAPOL fears that the current persecution of PKI 
suspects, ~luding the inexcusable re-interrogation of 
people who have already served lcng sentences, may be 
the prelude to arrests of people allegedly working for 
years in illegality. For sure, there will be many spin-
offs of the current anti-P.KI campaign. 
New rip-offs 
As if e:x-t:apols were not facing enough problems, the 
new wave of "alertness" provides the chance for lower 
civil servants at neighbourOOod or village level to 
extort cash when they b.lm up to report. It is a public 
secret that many who managed to build a new life have 
been the victims of extortioo for many years. Now, 
extortion rates have gene up since civil servants have 
not received a pa~rise for three years. However unjust 
the system may be, ex-ta.pol families would never dare to 
file a complaint. 
AJDther spin-off is that anti-communist rletoric gives 
highly-placed civil servants an excuse to sack 
''unfriendly' or "uncooperative" officials. It can also 
be used to incriminate rivals. A new hunting seascn has 
.iOOeed started. AccusatiCllS against important figures in 
society has beoome part of the game. One that reached 
the headlines was the accusation against Nico Da:cyanto, 
the Secretary-General of the PD I, that his stepfather 
was sacked from the army for involvement in the 1965 
affair, giving him an ''unclean environment::!' (tidak 
bersih linqkungan). 
Pamphlets circulating in Jakarta accuse Minister of 
Erergy GinaOOjar Kartasasmita and Abdurrachman Wahid, 
chairman of NU, of being part of a "PKI-Mosoow gaaj', 
together with Vice-President Sudharmmo and Attorney 
General Sukarton. 
There is even a 'teori penggembosan' or theory of 
deflation, claiming that Suharto is behiOO all this 
because he wants to make Sudharmono and ot:l'ers more 
dependent on himself. It is as i£ a Frankenstein has 
been let loose, whose creator is unknown. But it has 
fallen to Sldan o to bring things umer control and tame 
the monster. Otherwise things could get out of hand. 
Up-dating ex-prisoner archives 
Shortly after Sudomo's announcement.. General Rudini, 
announced that instructions have been sent to all 
regional and local government offices to update all 
their data on former members of the P .KI. All this data 
hasbeencanputetisedarrl washandedover in 1979 by the 
regional and local military rommands to the parallel 
local administrations. R uclini says many peep le may have 
changed their names or professiCllS so it is time for the 
data to be scrutinised again [Kompas. 19 June] 
The next day, the East Java's head of social and 
political affairs said a joint team of the army, the 
police, the public prosecutor and other authorities 
would examioo all the data on ec-prlsoners. He said ~me 
pecple had tried to hide their tracks, some had secretly 
moved and some had died. 
Whilstnewspapers have been full of malicious, anti-
rommunist venom, there is a oonspicuous absence of 
protest from the churches or from NG Os like the Legal 
Aid Instib.lte. However, a few articles have appeared in 
the press criticising the system to check that people 
have a 'clean political environmmt'. One article from 
Kompas, was published in the last TAPOL Bulletin. 
Another wams against ''using extremist methods to fight 
extremism". Punishing pecple for having an 'unclean' 
environment means penalising people not for anything 
they have done but simply because of their blood or 
marital ties. It means making people incriminate 
themselves in violation of their rights. The writer 
ridicules the roncept of 'clean' and 'unclean' families 
bytakingtheexampleof Gereral Parman, a victim of the 
September 30 1965 kidnappings [alleged by the government 
to have beenperpetratedbycommunists]. Parman was tha 
brother of Sakirman, a member of the P.KI politbureau. 
Should Parman be classified as 'unclean' or soould 
Sakirman be classified as 'clean'? [ Kompas, 27 April] 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial 
6 
Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy 
tenns of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, 
conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or 
journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing 
incidents that were never properly investigated. 
The trials followed the anny's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 
1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed 
crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military 
government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from 
proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles. 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the 
continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime. 
'The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state 
that is more than 90 per cent Muslim. by a regime committed to establishing W estem norms 
and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers 
is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Muslims on trial. Although it focuses on events in 
Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently 
unstable and are invariably held together by oppression." 
Dr. M. Ghayasuddln, Editor, MusUmedia 
128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p. 
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Pramoedya's latest book banned 
A centrepiece in the present wave of anti-communist 
fervrur is tha bam.ing of R umah K aca (The Glasshouse) by 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer. This is the fourth in a quartet 
of books, all written while Pramoedya was a political 
prisoner in the Buru Island labour camp. The first 
three, BumiMarusia (This Earth of Mankind), Anak Semua 
Bangsa (A Child of All Nations) and Jejak Langkah 
{Footsteps) have all been banned, along with another of 
Pramoedya's books, Sang Pemula (The Initiator). 
Announcing the ban on 9 June, Sukarton Marmosudjono, 
the Attorney-General (one of the targets of the 
'hawkish' anti-communist campaign against the 
government), alleged that communist OOctrine had been 
'slipped in'. Media reports of Sukarton's press 
oonference qud:e him as making a nurn ber of preposterous 
charges against the book: "Creating public unrest and 
motivating funner 1hcblesian Commtmist Part¥ members who 
have been released to form an illegal movement." Or: 
"Clearly revealing Marx's labour theory as well as 
continuing Leninist themes." Or: "Poisoning the minds of 
the public and disrupting public order." Or: "Diluting 
religious teaching." In support of the latter claim, 
Sukartxmquoteddialogue from the book in which someone 
said: "Why be sentimental about death? Is it only 
because, from infancy, we have been fed with stories 
about devils and angels, heaven and earth?" 
The ban requires anyone storing, distributing or 
knowing abrut the distribution of the boak to surrerrler 
the oopies or report to the nearest public prosecutor or 
police. 
Admiral Sl.xbroo, cne-t:ime oornmaroer of the all-powerful 
~ oommand, Kopkamtib and row Ministe~Coordinator 
for Political and Security Affairs, was at Sukarton' s 
A demonstrat:im outs:ida the IndJnes:ian embassy in 
London in 1981. The writer, Salman Rushdie joined the 
protest. 
side wren he anrounced the ban, and claimed: "We adhere 
todemoci:atic t:mught and no-me needs a permit to write 
something. Only after the work is published can we take 
measures, such as this present ban." [Kompas, 10 June] 
But according to one journalist woo was present. 
Sukarton said his office was considering introducing a 
regul.atlm thatwo.lldrequire a former member of the PKI 
to have a permit before s/he could write anyt:hinq 
[ Merdeka, 10 June]. 
Sudomo also said: "We are still thinking abrut 
possible legal action against the author'' [Jakarta Post, 
10 June]. 
'IhedailyJa.yakarta, whJchha9 spearheaded the current 
anti-communist venom, making claims about top-level 
infiltration, has also spotted a serious anomaly in tm 
restrictions on ex-tapol activity. Whereas they are 
p:cdrlb:lte:i from erted.rg government service or tre armed 
forces, from working in 'vital' enterprises and engaging 
in work that oould .influence the public at large, there 
is no prohibition against them running a publishing 
business. The director of Basta Mitra, the company which 
has published all Pramoedya's recent books, is an ex-
tapol, like Pramoedya himself. "Publishing has a wide 
impac~ including press publishing and the publication 
of books." [See "Press cOV'erage of the communist danger'' 
in Kompas, 15 June 1988.] 
Meanwhile, in Jogjakarta, a student identified only by 
his initials, BS, was arrested because he was disC01Tered 
selling ccpies of Rumah Kaea, as well as other banned 
books by Pramoedya. He was also fotmd to have lottery 
tickets on him. He was said to be selling the books "on 
the quiet" to people attending a performance of a play 
called "Tahanan" (The Prisoner) and later said that he 
didnotkrow that the book had been banned and was only 
do it to ea.m a bit of mooey [Kedaulatan Rak~ 11 
J~. * 
Pramoedya answers 
former Pedoman editor 
A few weeks before his book was banned, Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer respalded angrily to an attack on him in 
&Jara PembanJaQ made by Ra;ihan Anwar, former editor of 
Pedoman, the daily that was several times suspended 
du:d.ng the Sukarno era and was closed d:>wn for good 
under Suharto in 1971. Pramoedya's reply was published 
in Suara Pembaruan on 21 May. 
One might have expected a joornalist like Rosihan 
Anwar to respect people's freedom of expression and 
opinion but. like so many somewhat liberally-minded 
Indcnesian intellectuals, his anti.-oommunism subsumes 
everyt:.hjng else. The essence of his article was an 
attempt to belittle the significance of the Freedom-to-
Write Award to Pramoedya annm::ed by the PEN American 
Centre in April this year. 
He described firstoow papers like Pedoman, during its 
polemics in the early 1960s with leftwing newspapers, 
always needed to be alert about the (alleged) PKI links 
of peq>le woose writings they responded to. ''It was 
necessary to examine whether they were not trying to 
sweep away the tracks of their past so as to be able to 
appear with a new image." ---... 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 88, August 1988 7 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
He accepted that :it.was within PEN 's rights to give an 
award to anyone they tmught crone within their criteria. 
"PEN is mt an organisation of communist writers. It is 
international in scope and is widely respected. The 
Ird:>nesian writer who received the award with the prize 
money of $3,000 is entitla::l to feel delighted, as long 
as he c:X>es mt utilise the award to create a new image 
for himself." Rosihan then went on to accuse Pramoedya 
of using his Lentera column in B:intang Timur in the 
early 1960s "to pulverise and butcher" writers who 
q>posed the PK~ and to p:rq>agate the views of Lekra 
which was a stooge-organisation of the PKt'. [5uara 
Pembaruan, 29 April 1988) 
Pramoedya's reply 
In his reply, Prainoedya recalled first how Rosihan, on 
a visit to Buru Island with General Sumitro in 1973 
(where Prameodya was being held as an untried political 
prisoner), referred to him as 'tragiC'. ''The siblation 
did nct: allow me to asked him: was my being tragic a 
part of the national tragedy or specific to myself as 
somecne with no ground to stand oo." He went om 
"The words 'pulverise' and 'butcher' imply criminal 
acts. Nooe other than Haji Ros.ihan Anwar himself, as a 
senior joumalist, koows that the articles in Lentera 
were part of normal polemics in which anyone could 
participate, including himself and Hainka. If they 
suggested criminal acts ••• , why did he not romplain to 
tre authorities? Wasn't my address well koowh? I have 
never fled with a Dutch convoy or suchlike." 
Prainoedya recalled that the main purpose of the 
Lentera articles was to clean up Irrlonesian literature 
from plagiarism. "What's wrong with that? As a senior 
joumalist with a brilliang memory, H. Rosihan Anwar 
surely remembers that Hamka's plagiarism was an issue in 
the press for three months, a record in the history of 
tre Indornsian press •••• Strangely, Hamka himself never 
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romplained of being 'pulverised' or 'butchered'. He even 
once wrote in a west sumatran paper that it was all the 
fuss about plagiarism that had helped to sell his books. 
Almost a quarter of a century has passed and all this 
carmot be dragged up just like that. H. R osihan Anwar 
can easily get all the cHppings he needs." 
(The follow.ing senten::e in Prainoedya's original letter 
was not included in the text published by SUara 
Pembaruan. It read: "For the time being, I carmot do 
this because my home and everything in it, including my 
entire library and documentation, is still lll'lder seizure 
by those in power, and have not been returned to me."] 
Pramoec;ra also attacked Rosihan for using the word 
'stooge' about a certain political party. "Are not all 
parties created by groups of people with ideals, 
regardless of whether that party is right or wrong, a 
failure or a victor? Not by groups of criminals without 
consciences? I am certain Haji Rosihan Anwar is not a 
stoc:XJe in the eyes of peq>le from other parties because 
he too has noble ideas." 
Abrut sweeping a way tre tracks of the past, P ramoedya 
said: "As far as I'm concerned there is nothing in my 
passed that! need to sweep away. Haji Rosihan Anwar's 
slues do not fit me at all. And I'm sure he read my 
letter to President Suharto replying to his letter of 10 
November 1973. My letter was published in some 
newspapers at the time. I shall quote from it for him: 
'I entered the world and leave behind footsteps of my 
jourrey which can be judged by anyone." [suara 
Pembaruan, 21 May] 
New threats to the press 
Following the publication of Pramoedya's letter, 
President Suharto summoned the Minister of Information 
and instructed him ''to put firmly in order all th:>se 
publications where communist or mand.st writings have 
crawled in" [ Kompas, 2 June]. The Minister, Harmoko, 
said after meeting the President, that the mass media 
wrul.d have to increase vigilance against ideas spread by 
PK I remnants. Asked whether he rould menticn names of 
papers, Harmcko gave ooe example but only 'off the 
rerord'. Evidently, the example was 5uara Pembaruan, 
(the paper which took the place of Sinar Barapan. months 
after it was banned in October 1986), for publishing 
P ramoedya' s letter. ~ 
• 
STOP PRESS 
Transmigration threat to West Papuan 
highlands 
Indooesia has announced plans to open up transmigration 
sites in the district of Jayawijaya, which includes the 
central highlands, the most densely pq>ulated region of 
West Papua. This contradicts a claim made recently by 
tre World Bank that "there are no plans to settle 
migrants in the densely-populated highlands where the 
majority of Irianese (sic) live". 
In the more fertile areas of the highlands, the tribal 
peoples live from garden cultivation, pig-rearing and 
sago. There has been strong resistaoce in the highlands 
to the Indonesian presence for many years. The invasion 
of the region by Javanese settlers is certain to cause 
w !despread resentment and disruption. 
Survival International has called on the Indonesian 
Government to halt this progamme and has latmchoo an 
Urgent Action appeal in support of this call. 
• 
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The second coming of Admiral Sudomo 
It was something of a surprise wren in March this year, 
Admiral Sld:>mo, <neof General Suharto's longest-serving 
supµ:>rtErs, was ramed Minister-Coordinator for Political 
and Security Affairs. According to the gossip, the 63-
year old Admiral wanted to take things easy and retire, 
but Slharto had <*her plans. As a constant figure in the 
General's inner core, SUdomo has survived many storms. 
Over the years, re has grown ever closer to the 'bapak' 
of the Republic. 
SuhartD's inner core 
Ever since Suharto took charg~ a few hand-picked men 
have stood by his side. The inner core has changed over 
time. some generals like Ali Murtopo and SUdjono 
Humardani have died while others, like Suryo or 
Alamsyah, have been replaced by younger men. At first, 
his inner core consisted primarily of officers from 
Diporegoro, the Central Java division led by SUharto in 
the fifties. Gradually, others were recruited, during 
the early sixties Mandala campaign to annex West Papua 
and the campaign to confront Malaysia. As overall 
Mandala cnmmanrer, Suharto had many officers under him 
some of whom, like Benny Murdani and Sudomo, he drew 
into his team . 
Many f.in:i it puzzling that SUdomo was appointed naval 
cnmman<Er of the Mandala campaign in 1961. On his very 
first voyage as a ship's captain, he crashed his vessel 
into a quayside. SUdomo is unique among Suharto's inner 
core as the only officer outside the army to have held 
so many rnaj)rdecis:lon-making positions. All otbar naval 
and air farce officers have remain:?d obscure figures. 
The Aru Sea disaster 
But first, what of Sudomo's naval career? On the night 
of 15 January 1962, three Indonesian torpedo boats 
(MTBs) wereheadingtowards Kaimanain West Papua with 
instructions to land roe hundred cnmmandcs on the Dutch-
held territory. On board the Marjan Tutul was Deputy 
Naval Chief, Comrnod::>re Jos SUdarso in cnmmand, 
while Sudomo was commanding another vessel and in 
overall command of the operation. As they neared the 
WestPapuancoast, the MTBs were spotted by the Dutch 
frigate, K ortenaer. After a brief skirmish, the Marjan 
Tutlll was hit and sank in twency minutes. The ot:ter two 
vessels under SUdomo's command tllrned and fled, leaving 
dozens oflnd:>nesian se:unen struggling in the water. Jos 
Sudarso died and was proclaimed a national hero while 
Sudomo had to defend himself against charges of 
cowardice. The Dutch resrued 54 Indmesian survivors 
while the dead, including Sudarso, were buried by the 
Dutch in Kairnana. SUdomo has always defended himself, 
saying his mission was to land commandos, not to engage 
in a naval battle. 
The sh:lme of this debacle made Sudomo's positioo as 
director of naval operations untenable. He was soon 
shifted to Inkopal, the navy's central purchasing board, 
in charge of keeping the foroe supplied with basic 
foodstuffs. ButSudomo's career took another sharp turn 
when he was caught red-handed in a corruption scandal. 
Had he been a civilian, he would certainly lave been 
tried in cx:urt, but instead, he was promoted to a senior 
post at the Shipping Ministry. Here, too, Sudomo 
concocted all ki.rrls of bureaucratic schemes which 
provided plenty of scope for bribery and corruption. 
Strlomo remained in the civilian sector for many years, 
enridrl.nghimself. He has become one of Ind:>nesia's most 
affluent officers arrl a well-known socialite. His home 
in Jakarta is one of the most luxurious, with marble 
stairs and an incbor swimming-pool. Since his marriage 
broke up, he has been talked about as Indonesia's most 
sought-after bachelor. 
Purging the navy 
Sudomo's first Herculean task after Suharto's seizure 
of power was when, as chief-of-staff of the navy from 
1969 ti.111973, he was charged with purging the ranks of 
naval and marine officers of leftists and SukalllOists. 
He did this w:ith such enthusiasm, seeing off more than 
1,500 officers, that a joke circulated at the time that 
if someoo.e did not stop him soon, Indonesia would end up 
with a fleet of vessels but no-one to operate them. 
Sudomo used the purge to settle old soores, but his 
primary duty was to cleanse the navy of its anti New 
Order reputation and its nostalgia for Sukarno. To 
Suharto both the navy arx1 the · marine oorps were serurity 
threats. To this day, many retired officers still bear 
deep grudges against Sudomo for the ruthless way he cut 
short their naval careers. 
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His K opkamtib career 
After having cleaned up the navy, Sudomo was appointed 
chief-c£-st:afI er. Kopkamtib, the Operational Command for 
the Restoratioo of Security arrl Order. This appointment 
came on 20 January 1974, a few days after an anti.-
Japanese student demonstration in Jakarta brought into 
the open the fierce rivalry between General Ali Murtx:po, 
one of Suharto's closest associates, and Gereral 
Sumitro, than depucy-commarrler of the armed forces and 
commarrlerof Kopkamtib. As Kcpkarntib chief-of-staff, 
SUoomo was in a good position to keep an eye on Sumitro 
until his dismissal a few months later. It was this job 
that earned SUdomo the nickname, 'Suharto's watchfog'. 
For the first few years after 1965, Suharto had kept 
Kopkamtib urrler his pE!r9)nal oomrnand and it was only in 
the early 1970s, as he became increasingly pre-occupied 
with state affairs, that he entrusted the oommandership 
to the deputy-oommander of the armed forces. But after 
Sumitro was rusted, Suharto took back commandership of 
Kcpkarnti.b. Sudomo stayed en as chief-of-staff and was 
effectively in charge of security operations. For the 
next eight years, Sudano' s name became synonymrus with 
Kopkamtib. He was responsible for the political 
prisoners, for press censorship, for the arrest and 
persecution of Muslim activists and, yes, even for tlie 
anti-corruption campaign. 
In 1978, he became commarrler of Kopkamtib and 
ooncurrentl.y deputy-oommander of the armed forces. The 
commander, General Jusuf, lacked a power base in the 
armed forces arrl was at a disadvantage, being a non-
Javanese in the cwerwhelmingly Javanese general staff. 
Yusuf spent most of his ti.me touring the barracks and 
boosting morale while SUdomo took over most of the real 
responsibilities in the general staff. In theory, he was 
TAPOL again petitions 
the UN Decolonisation Committee 
For the third year running, TAPOL will submit a 
petitien to the UN Decolonisation Committee wren it 
meets in New York in August this year. The peti.tioo 
first analyses the background to Governor 
Carrascalao's recent plea for East Timer to be 
opened up. It then analyses in detail the strucb.lre 
of local gmrernmen~ revealing the extent to which 
local administration is subordinated to the military 
command structure at every level of government. 
It describes h:>w £Nery East Timorese woo occupies 
a positioo of leadership is accompanied by a 
'pendamping' (literally, 'one who accompanies'), a 
military officer whose duty is to watch arrl cmtrol 
'his' Timorese official. The petition also reveals 
for the first ti.me that in East Timer, babinsa 
officers, the village-level officers stationed in 
every village, are all re~beret soldiers from 
K cpassus, not soldiers from the territorial 
division. As e>cplained to TAPOL recently by an 
authoritative source, this is because Koopskam, the 
special security command in charge of East Timer, 
needs babinsas in East Timer to concentrate 
primarily on intelligence and control of a hostile 
population arrl this can ooly be assured if they are 
taken from Indonesia's elite para-commanoo unit. 
The full text of the TAPOL petition is available 
as Oocasional Reports No 9. 
answerable to Yusuf, but his K opkarntib position gave him 
direct access to Suharto as well as access downwards to 
the army command strucb.lre since all divisional and 
local commarrlers e>ercise special powers as K opkamtib 
officers or Laksusda. 
Sudomo looks back fondly on this period. It was, he 
says, 'nicer' being K q:>kamtib oommander than being a 
minister because 'you have power'. He relished the fact 
that the job gave him plenty of experience in closing 
oownnewspa~, arrldml.in.:J with the Holy war Command, 
the Imron case and other Muslim incidents, all of which, 
as he says himself, led to the 1985 laws on social 
organisaticns arrl political parties. In Sudomo's woros, 
Kq:>kamtib's operatiooal philosophy was "power for 
persuasion end pers.iasion for power'~ mbcing easily with 
all strata of society. [Jawa Pos, 11 March 1988, quoted 
in IN~ No 84). In fa~ he was admitting that military 
intelli<}ence had been engaged for years in monitoring 
and penetrating Muslim ranks. 
Taking on labour 
In 1983, SUdano was asked to step down from the power 
pinnacle he enjoyed so much, to take on the job of 
placing the fast-growing working class under the 
Pancasila yoke. Under his managemen~ the Labour 
Ministry refined the principle of what became known as 
'Pancasila industrial relations'. The whole idea of 
adversarial action by workers was to be ruled ou~ arrl 
replaced by the idea of workers, management and the 
government behaving like 'one big family'. Typical of 
his disdain for workers' rights is the following 
statement regarding the right to strike: 
Going on strike is certainly allowed by law, but 
many people oo not read the full text of this law 
which, by the way, is not operatiooal because the 
measures necessary for its implementation have not 
yet been introduced. Moreover, one must have 
.. 
Statement on EAST TIMOR 
to the ON Committee of 24 
August 1988 
occasional reports no. 9 
~nJ ,,._.._iuv,,..c.........,. 
~Ill _ ,,___ S...,CMIHW 
Copies of Occasicnal Reports are available from TA POL, 
price 80 pence a ropy, including posta(}e. Extra copies 
oost 30 pence each. 
Occasional Reports No 9, TAPOL's submission to the 
1988 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee, 
focusses en the militarised strucb.lre of the Indooesian 
administration in East Timer arrl the tight system of 
control which this imposes on the people. 
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permission to strike. And for sure, I will not give 
permissim to strike because, in my opinion, going 
on strike means applying principles of liberal 
thinking while we are already in the period of 
Pancasila Industrial Relations. [Derita Buana, 21 
December 1984) 
As Minister of Labour, he introduced new regulations 
on the role of the trade unions, and set up a tripartite 
system (labour, management and local officials) for 
controlling labour disputes. To prevent disputes from 
spilling CNer into strikes, he set up a 'task force' 
with military involvement, ready when necessary to take 
action against the workers. 
He also further tamed the FBSI, the cnly officially-
recognised trade wll.on federation, and succeeded in 
removing its leader, Agus Sudono, who was too mudl of a 
street-fighter with a following of his own to be 
amenable to regime control. 
But such 'dull' ministerial respoosibilities were 
clearly not to his liking. Shortly before Suharto 
armounced his new cabinet in March, Sudomo was 
complaining about years of "crowing without troops". 
What le wanted again was real power. At first sight, his 
appointment as Minister-Coordinator for Political and 
Seall:icy Affairs seemed to remove him still further from 
power. His predecessors in the positicn had been little 
more than decorations. But within weeks, Sudomo was 
showing remarkable confidence in his new job. 
One thing to his advantage is that this time round, 
Suharto is giving more authority to his minister-
coordinators. But primarily it is the character of 
Su<bmo himself that determmes what he will make of his 
new post. As Minister-Coordinator, he takes overall 
charge of a number of crucial ministries, including the 
home affairs and justice ministries and the attorney-
general's office, and foreign affairs. But in terms of 
top-level centres of power, Sudomo also functions as a 
middle-force between the two super-power centres, 
Murdani and Sudharmono. 
Murdani has placed many of the men he trusts in vital 
positions in the general staff and lower down in the 
army hierarchy, while Sudharmono, now vice-president, 
has strengthened his told over several ministries and 
over the bureaucracy. In other words, both men have 
their own power bases which could conceivably pose 
problems for Suharto. Sudomo has the special attraction 
for &lharto of being total! y loyal but lacking his own 
power base. In order not to get squeezed between the two 
super-powers, Suharto appears to have given Sudomo a 
central position, with vast powers that have until now 
been reserved for a Kopkamtib commander. 
Back in the Kopkamtib saddle? 
At the time of the cabinet changes in March, it was 
armounced that K opkamtib would be overhauled. To this 
day, the new format remains a mystery. General Murdani, 
mw M:inisterof Defmce and Security, is still Kopkamtib 
commander but appears to be more interested in other 
things. There is not much sign of Try Sutrisno, the new 
armed forces commander-in-chief, getting the job, 
lacking experience in intelligence and seruricy 
operations. But wittout waiting for any formal 
appointment, Sudomo is behaving as if he were back in 
his old job, defining strategies on how to run the 
latest campaign against former political prisoners and 
how to handle the current wave of student unrest. For 
reascns unexplained, he was at the Attorne~General's 
side when the lat±er announced the ban on Pramoedya's 
latest book. Suharto's old wat.chd:>g is back in power am 
no-one ooubts that he is thoroughly enjoying himself. 
ARMS SALES 
Update on British arms deals 
with Indonesia 
* Plessey Defence Systems of Christchurch, Kent have 
won a contract to supply a command and control 
information system called Generics to Inoonesia. The 
system is designed to give military commanders the 
latest in situation management capability, with up-to-
the-minute information on both friendly and hostile 
forces in the air, on sea or on land, integrated for 
rapid assessment. Indonesia is P lessey' s first customer 
for the system. [Jakarta Post, 24 May 1988) 
The Generics informat:kn system could well be used by 
Irrl:nesian trocps operating in East Tim or or West Papua, 
helping them to keep track of elusive and highly mobile 
guerrilla forces. 
* G KL, a Lonoon-based oompany has been involved for 
several years in refurbishing the 160 armed personnel 
carriers (APCs) -Salalins, Saracens and Ferrets - which 
the UK supplied to Inoonesia some fifteen to twenty 
years ago. G KL is refitting these counter-insurgency 
vehicles with new guns, equipping them with more up-to-
date equipment for present-day use and generally 
o.ierhaul.in;J t:rem. Trese APCs were used by the Indonesian 
armed forces to quell student demonstratioos during the 
1970s and are thrught to be in constant use in East 
Tim or. 
* British Aerospace, the UK company with the most 
eictensive arms deals with Inoonesia, is just completing 
the oonstruction of an Army College of Technology in 
East Java. The College, worth nearly £3 million, is the 
first ever built by BAe anywhere in the world. It will 
pI'OIT:ide a 27-mort:h rourse to ninecy students giving them 
the necessary backgrourrl to operate am mamtain the 
Rapier air-deferre missile defence system being supplied 
to InCbnesian by BAe. 
The constructioo of this College "came together 
tremerrlouslyquickly,11 said a senior BAe official. "This 
was because a st:n:ng trust had been built up between B Ae 
and the Inoonesian army." 
The cx::w:se management has been sub-contracted to Bell 
Educational Trust in Cambridge, and it is expected that 
the rnoonesian army will be able to take over the whole 
of the colle~ training in five or six years' time. [BAe 
News, Mardi 1988) • 
T APOL Bulletin No. 88, August 1988 11 
ECONOMICS 
IGGI almost doubles its aid to 
Indonesia 
Tre Inter-Governmental Group on In1onesia this year 
agreed to grant the ailing Indonesian eooromy a reoord 
$5.7 billion, which is nearly eighty per cent higher 
than the $3.15 billion granted last year. Japan alone 
acoounts for $2.3 billion of this total. 
In addition to project aid, which is tied to projects 
agreed between the d::>nor country or agency and 
Indonesia, and programme aid, which is untied and 
available for use over a five-year period, the IGGI this 
year decided to grant $2.4 billion in a new form of aid 
krown as 'special aid' which provides especially 
favourable terms of convertibility into rupiahs. This 
aid is a reserve of foreign currency that can be drawn 
on by Inck>resia within a year am sold on the foreign 
ecchange market to finance imports. The rupiah proceeds 
will be used to cover the rupiah ccsts of government 
projects. This huge chunk of aid will therefore help to 
reduce Inck>resia's balance of payments deficit and 
finance the governmmt's budget deficit. 
$600 million of this special aid (from Japan) is 
included in the total of $4.01 billion which was 
anno~ as IG GI's allocation for this year, but most 
of the special aid is described as being "outside the 
IGGI scheme" [Jakarta~ 17 June]. IGGI aid this year 
therefore oonsists of $4.01 billion plus $1.7 billion 
'special aid' which, for reasons as yet unclear, is 
described as being 'outside the IGGI scheme'. 
Tre breakdown of the $4.01 billion portion of IGGI aid 
is as follows: 
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
France 
West Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Spain 
Switzerland 
UK 
USA 
Bilateral aid 
$ 37.6 
$ 8.16 
$ 39.47 
$ 179.41 
$ 105.99 
$ 66.66 
$ 1,400.00 
$ 92.97 
$ 2.44 
$ 30.00 
$ 15.77 
$ 109.22 
$ 90.00 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
million 
Multilateral aid 
World Bank 
Asian Development Bank 
UN Development Programme 
UNFPA 
World Food Programme 
IFAD 
EEC 
UNICEF 
$ 1,200.00 million 
$ 550.00 million 
$ 32.00 million 
$ 7 .00 million 
$ 10.00 million 
$ 15.00 million 
$ 18.04 million 
$ 6.00 million 
The breakd::>wn of the special aid (part inside am part 
outside the IG GI scheme) is as follows: 
Japan 
Fran::e 
$ 1, 7 00.00 million 
$ 39.96 million 
West Germany 
Netherlands 
USA 
World Bank 
Asian Development Bank 
$ 22.92 million 
$ 84.29 million 
$ 67.00 million 
$ 300.00 million 
$ 150.00 million 
Sources: Kompas. 16 June and Jakarta Post, 17 June 1988. 
A numberofIGGica.mtries have agreed to give part or 
all of their aid this year in the form of an outright 
gift. These include Australia and Canada (100 per cent 
gift), the Netherlands (60 per cent) and the USA (57 per 
cent) [Tempo, 25 June]. 
More aid from the UK 
The UK deci.si01 to make a rew aid oommitment this year 
certainly came as something of a surprise. Only days 
befbrethe IGGI met in Holland, the British Secretary of 
State for Energy, Cecil Parkinson, on a visit to 
Jakarta, was showing impati.ence with Inionesia because 
it had failed to take up the lion's share of the £140 
million in soft loans granted to Indonesia in June 1986. 
So far, ooly two projects worth about £20 million each 
have been initiated. The outstanding credit of £100 
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million is due to exp!Ie in September this year, unless 
the Thatcher GOJernment agrees to allow an extension 
[Jakarta Post, 9 June, and Financial Times, 10 June]. 
Yet the UK agreed on an extra commitment this year of 
$100 million. The Financial Times [30 June] quoted a 
British aid official as saying: "We just have to hang in 
there". It added that the new allocation was "a measured 
decision by the UK, part goodwill, part commercial 
necessity (because) it is well aware that any recovery 
in the Wonesian ecommy could cpen up a vast market 
for major infrastructure projects". 
Among the British rompanies hop.ing to cash in on the 
credits made available by the British taxpayer are 
British Petroleum fur a proposed oil refinery r'despite 
the over-capacity in the region", adds Financial Times), 
Trafalgar House which is negotiating involvement in 
ronstruction c£. a toll-road scheme worth £400 million, 
and British Aerospace whidl is antic.ipating a deal for 
its latest military airer~ the Hawk 200. 
Why so much support for Indonesia? 
The Indonesian Government, supported by most of the 
Indcnesian press, has welcomed this year's IGGI aid 
comm:itment as proof c£. renewed international confidence 
in the Indonesian economy. There has been hardly any 
criticism, apart from some rather muted worries that a 
country already so heavily in debt soould set about 
resolving its problem by relying on yet more external 
borrowing. According to one daily, IG GI aid to InCbnesia 
is mw larger than that given by aid consortiums to any 
other country [ Kompas, 17 June 1988). 
According to the World Bank's 1988 Report on 
Indonesia, Inoonesia' s tot.al disbursed debt had reached 
$41.28 billion by the errl of 1987. Servicing the debt 
now requires almost 40 per cent of foreign exchange 
earnings, whereas 52.8 per cent of the state's routine 
expenditure has to be used to repay creditors and pay 
interest charges. 
But more than $17 billion of foreign aid committed 
before 198~ is undisbursed, making one worrler why yet 
more aid is caisidered to be necessary, when so much has 
not yet been taken up. 
The fact is that many economic projects are not able 
to proceed because of the lack of rupiahs to finance 
domestic costs, which is partly because so much state 
Ji"'""' j1J90. ,'J.Q ..... 
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ECONOMICS 
revenue has to be set aside to service debt repayments. 
This explains why so much c£. this year's aid commitment 
is given in the furm of 'special assistance' aid. But 
this alone does not explain why IG GI countries have 
decided to be so generous to Inoonesia. 
All-out Japanese support 
Certainly a ma:Pr factor is Tokyo's decision to give 
Indonesia $2.3 billion this year, which is 87 per cent 
higher than Japan's aid rommitment last year. More than 
ever now, it is Japan that is calling the tune in 
Irrlonesia and in the IGGI. More than a thini of 
Irrlonesia's bilateral external debt is owed to Japan. It 
is significant that the Japanese decision was armounced 
a couple of weeks before the IGGI meeting, giving the 
signal to other member-states to pull rut all the stops 
to help. West European countries in particular seem 
determined to preserve their stake in the Indcnesian 
eccnomy, particularly in the face of growing oompetit:ial 
from Japan. 
Mudlenthusiasm has been expressed by IMF and World 
Bank spokesmen and western erommics ministers over 
Wonesia's repeated pledge that it does not want to 
alleviate its d:!bt servicing burden by seeking to r~ 
schedule its debt payments. Even so, Indooesia made 
strenuous efforts to convince Japan to agree to 
'restructure' its obligations towards that country. 
After all, as manyecommists have stressed, ore crucial 
factor causing Irrlonesia's debt service ratio to rise so 
dramatically is the strength of the Japanese yen against 
the dollar. To rompensate for what has become known as 
the 'yendaka' factor, Indonesia wanted Japan either to 
convert part of its past debts into grants, or to give 
patt of this year's commitmert. in the form of a grant, 
or to allow Inoonesia to repay Japan not at the current 
dollar-yen exchange rate but at the rate that was valid 
when the credit was received, when the dollar was a much 
stronger currency. Japan firmly rejected all three 
p:r:q:>csals arrl the Japanese ambassaor in Jakarta did oot 
conceal his annoyance when, even after the $2.3 billion 
allocat:ial had been aIUlOWlCed, Indooesia's Finance 
Minister, J.B. Sumarlin, again publicly urged Japan to 
consider one of these alternatives. 
According to a statement by w idjojo Nitisastra, woo 
negotiated the aid package from Japan on Suharto's 
bEhalf, Japan's aidcommitmert. for 1988 is precisely the 
same as the arnOlllt that Indcnesia must pay Japan this 
year to service its debt [Kompas, 2 June]. Japan seems 
to be 'giving' Inoonesia with cne hand what it will take 
back 'with the other, so why not just cancel the debt7 
Clearly such a straightforward solutioo would not 
enhance Japan's grip on the InCbnesian ecommy. 
Japan is by far the largest investor in Indonesia. Its 
investments in sectors other than the oil, gas and 
financial sectors since 1967 have reached $5.8 billion, 
followed by Hongkong (with$2.0l billion), West Germany 
($1.81 billion), the US (El.24 billion) and the 
Netherlarrls ($1.13). Its lead in the oil/gas and 
financial sectors is even more striking, with a total of 
$9 billioo, as compared with its closest rival, the US, 
at $4 billion [Jakarta Post, 11 June 1988). 
Tempo, 25 June 1988. 
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Switching to export orientation 
But the Japanese factor is ooly part of the story. 
There have been imp'.)rtant shifts in Indonesian economic 
policy in the past year or so. The fall in the price of 
oil has forced Indonesia to focus more heavily on 
promoting noo-oi.l exports to reverse its ever worsening 
balan::l:? of p:iyffients deficit. De-regulatory measures have 
been introduced, promoting the interests of eiporters. 
Under stroog pressure from the World Bank, there has 
been a shift away from import substitution, towards 
export orientation. This is very welcome to i.Jrlustrial 
natioos which are keen to penetrate the Indcnesian 
market with their own products and strongly q>pcse the 
whole idea of import substitution. 
A second shift has been in favour of foreign capital 
investment. For many years, the government has kept 
certain i.rrlustries off-limits to foreign investors, laid 
down stringent rules to secure majority Indonesian 
participation in companies set up with foreign capital, 
and limited the role of foreign personnel. These 
protective measures are fast disintegrating. A package 
of measures last December removed the ban on foreign 
companies in Indonesia handling exports, and recently, 
the Capital Investment Board annoW1Ced that foreign 
investors are no longer bound by a minimum of one 
million d:>llars for an investment project. This is 
particularly welrome to pct.enti.al investors from Asia's 
newly-industrialised countries (NICs) who now need to 
find investment havens off-shore because of rising 
labour costs at tome and, in the case of South Korea, 
growing labour unrest. 
The re-adjustments introduced in the past year or so 
are precisely what the internati.ooal financial oommunity 
has been wanting for mmy years. The aid oommitted this 
year is by way of. a reward for compliance and a means of 
pressing far yet more re-adjustments, as is abundantly 
clear from statements emanating from the IGGI meeting. 
Dutch Minister for Overseas Cocperation, Piet Bukman, 
said that aid will ronti.nue to be needed by rnCbnesia 
"until stable growth has been restored", while the final 
statement stressed that Indonesia will need more help 
from the international dooor community to carrv out 
further re-adjustments, to improve the climate for 
investment and to enhance the orientation towards 
exports {Kompas, 17 June]. 
The massive emphasis on balance of payments support 
means t:h:tt the indlstrial nations also want to prop up 
Indonesia's currency reserves, thus avoiding a further 
devaluation of the rupiah or runs on foreign exchange 
that have been so harmful to foreign investors in 
Indooesia in the past few years. 
Ab01Te all, this year's aid commitments have greatly 
reinforred Indonesia's deperrlence on foreign aid and 
investment, putting a stop to the nationalism and 
protectionism which marked Indonesian economic policy 
throughout the period of the oil boom. 
What no-one mentions in all this is that In<bnesia's 
autlx>ritarian regime and Suharto's track reoord as one 
of the world's longest-ruling dictators leads foreign 
investors and financiers to believe that their growing 
interests in Indonesia are likely to enjoy military 
protection for some ti.me to come. Political security has 
now oombined with economic circumstances that have 
forced Jakarta to comply w .ith investors demands, making 
Indooesia one of the mo;t attractive countries in the 
Third World to investors from both east and west. 
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"---\ help from President Suharto. 
Will the real HMI stand up? 
Ever since the 16th Congress of the HMI (Himpunan 
Mahasisw a Islam, Islamic Students Association) two years 
ago in Padang, the organisation has been split in two. 
The sa.rrce of the conflict was whether to accept the 
State cbctri.ra of Pancasila as the sole principle or to 
stick to the H MI' s original ideals. 
Since then, tie rift has widened, as became apparent 
when the two wings held coogresses which sh:>wed h:>w far 
apart they were. The 'official' wing has gradually 
adjusted itself to its new role as a Pancasila 
organisation, flirting with Golkar, the g01Ternment 
party, to win of.f icial favour. It was even being 
suggesta:l, as the 17th Congress drew near, that it be 
re-named thelrrlcnesianStllcEnts Union, removing 'Islam' 
from its title. The other wing, known as Majelis 
Pen:yelamat Organisation (MPO) or Council to Safeguard 
the Organisation, has stuck to its Islamic principles. 
The MPO CoJl3ress in Kaliurang, Jogjakarta, took place 
without distllrbanre. Everything prcceeding acoording to 
plan. There were 150 delegates from thirteen branches. 
It was deci<Ed to stick to the principle laid down when 
the HMI was foonded in 1947. The only 'flaw' was the 
lack of a pennit. In a C'OWltry where even the mcst 
innocuous social gathering needs official permission, it 
was quite risky to hold such a large meeting without 
police approll'al. The resigning chairman, E ggie Sudjana, 
said they had taken a calculated risk: ''If we had 
applied for a permi~ would they have given us one?" 
[Tempo, 14 July 1988.) For the rext two years, the MPO 
will be chaired by Tamsil Linrung from Ujung Pandang, 
South SUlawesi. 
By contrast the 'official' Congress in Lhokseumawe, 
Aceh, was in blrmoil from start to finish and had to go 
on for an extra two days to finish its agenda. Virtually 
every speaker was shouted oown. Despite gOV'ernment 
backing, the chair man, Saleh Khalid had difficulty 
getting endorsement for his end-of-term report. During 
his two years in office, he had reshuffled the board 
twice because of internal frictions. 
Altb:mgh the 'official' wing can claim to represent 
the majoricy of members, it has been greatly weakened 
by rifts arrl personal ambitions. The HMI, traditiooally 
Indooesia's largest sbldent federation, is fast losing 
influence on the campuses. The acbption of Pancasila is 
clearly at the root of the trouble. 1c 
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A new generation of student protest 
After ljears of silence, Indonesian students are beginning to shaw their muscle again. Far the first twelve 1Jears of 
Suharto's rule, the student movement was an integral part of political processes, at first supporting the militarlj 
takeover, then later coming autin apposition to the militarlj government. Since 1978, the movement has been muzzled. Now, 
a~er nearllJ a decade, students appear to be finding new waljs to shaw their anger at the lack of demacraclJ, the law 
standards of education and exorbitant tuition fees. 
Earlier generations of stndent protest 
Without organised student actioo in 1965-66, General 
Suharto would have had more difficulty oonsolidating his 
seizure of power. The alliance struck between the armed 
forcesardtheSb.ldentActioo Front (KAM:O help SUharto 
w.in support from a sizable section of the middle class, 
while student demonstratioos helped to paralyse life in 
the big cities. Alw a:ys a shrewd strategist, SUharto was 
able to create the impress.ion that the armed forces were 
not responsible for the turmoil in the streets. The 
ttu:eedemandsvoiced by KAMI which had been drafted by 
army intelligence - replacing Sukarno's ministers, 
cutting prices and harming the Communist Party - played 
a key role in discrediting the then president, loosening 
his grip on power, very much to Suharto's advantage. 
Harlan KAMI, the roovement's daily paper servErl as an 
effective rallying point for students ard intellectuals, 
though once KAMI had servErl its purpose and the paper 
started criticising the monster it had helped create, 
the government quickly moved to ban it for gocxl. 
Not much is left of the largely right-wing, anti-
communist KAMI generation. Some of its leading lights 
became disillusiomd and lost interest in politics. Some 
of these, now in their early forties, are warning 
today's generation of student activists against doing 
anyth.ing. In the em, they say with some justification, 
the students will only be used by the generals again. 
Over the years, student protest has been dogged by 
interference from warring army factions. 
Other disillusioned 1966 activists have found a place 
in non-governmental organisations (NG 0 s). Some have 
acknowledgErl treir lamentable role in helping ooe of the 
lorgest surviving military regimes to win power, and now 
recognise that, with the destruction of the PKI, the 
trade unions and otler leftwing organisatioos, Indonesia 
is bereft of a countervailing force. As one KAMI old-
ti.mer said recently: "We are left with a nation of ducks 
(manusia bebek), with a follow-my-leader mentality." 
Anothar group of KAMI activists are now mapan, or 
'arrivee'. Cosmas Bab.Ibara, formerly a Catholic student 
leader, is Minister of Labour, while Sofyan W anandi, 
also a Cath:>lic student leader, runs PT Truba, the 
holding company of all military corporations. Fahrni 
Idris, another fonner activist turned 'fat cat', runs a 
number of enterprises. But the successful ones are few 
in number and must be aware of the fate that could 
befall them if their loyalty to Suharto soow s signs of 
slippirg. Trey have Abdul Gafur as an example, discarded 
by Suharto .in the latest cabinet reshuffle, after years 
of devoted service. 
In aoother category stands Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, 
General Secretary cf. Golkar am oow a cabinet minister. 
He represents those woo decided from the start to "work 
within the s:ystem". Trere are many highly-placed civil 
servants and professors in this category, not 
necessarily at ore in their hearts with militarism but 
survivalists by nature. 
The Malari. movement 
The student movements of the seventies generated far 
less acoommodationism than did KAMI. An important 
difference is that, whereas the KAMI leaders believed 
that a coalition with the armed forces would restore 
democracy, later activists had no such illusions. 
The sb.ldent unrest that climaxed in 1974 is koown as 
Malari., the 15 January Catastropre. As in the sixties, 
the demands were not confined to student affairs but 
dealt with national political issues. These were a true 
reflectioo of the situation at the time. 
Suharto and his technocrats were busy attracting 
foreign investment while relying on massive foreign aid 
from the Inter-Governmental Group ai. Ind:>nesia (IGG:O 
chaired by the Dutch g01Ternment. Japanese oorporati.ons 
were taking advantage of this q>en-door policy, flooding 
the cities with consumer goods, promoted by flashy ads. 
Malari peaked with the visits of Jan Praik, Dutch 
Minister fur Develcpnent Coo~ation and IG GI chair, and 
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Many saw Pronk as 
"capitalism with a gentle face" while Tanaka was the 
"Gordon Geltko of the seventies". The demonstration for 
Pronk was friendly, but Tanaka's 'welcome' turned into a 
huge anti-Japanese rally where Japanese cars, motor-
bikes arrl billboards were destroyErl. While the sbldents 
showed no prefermce as between the Pronk model and the 
Tanaka mcrle~ ccndemning OOt:has a sell-out, generals at 
the top did have clear preferences. SUharto's closest 
aides in his personal staff, ASPRI, were part of the 
Japanese lobby while General SUmitro, then deputy-
___.. 
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commander of the armed forces and oommander of the 
powerful Kcpkamtib, was seen as leaning towards the 
western option. 
Suharto kept his options open, reoognis.ing the need 
for both. A violent clash between the two cliques of 
generals exploded in the streets on 15 January 197 4. 
General Ali Murt:opo of the ASPRI wing orchestrated 
rioting and looting which led to the gutting of a four-
storey sh:>pp.ing-oentre. Althcugh few ooubted that 
Murtopo's notorious Opsus outfit was responsible, the 
sb.xJents were bl.aned. Tre m01Tement was crushed and many 
activists were arrested, while Sumitro and his group 
were fired. 
Few Malari figures became accornmodationists and most 
have .retained treirrefurrningzeal, working in NG Os. An 
excepticn is Theo Sambuaga who won a pa;ition in the 
official youth body, KNPI and is now creeping up the 
Golkar ladder. 
AlthrughMalarifailedto build bridges with the urban 
IX>Or and the emerging working class, its demands enjoyed 
great pcpularicy. But the impression lives on that 
Malarl wasusedbypro-westem generals totake a swipe 
at the Japanese lobby. This was reinforced by Suharto's 
decision, after Malarl, to disband ASPRI, a shrewd move 
to replace poor achievers like General Suryo. It gave 
him a chance to reshuffle his inner core while giving 
the impression that he was meeting the sb.Idents' 
demarx:ls. 
The 1977 /78 movement 
By 1977, the eronomic sib.lation in Indonesia had 
changed. While it was reaping the benefits of the oil 
boom, the state oil oompany, Pertamina had collapsed 
t:iu:alghoorrup:ialarrl mismanagement, only to be rescued 
bytheIMF. Suharto, row firmly in power for more than a 
decade, was showing his true colours as a despotic 
cyrcrit, centralising power in the hands of a small 
cUque, accumulating wealth arrl. building the famdations 
of a hugely wealthy extended First Family. 
From a 1978 stndentpamphlet: "Return the armed forces 
to their prq>er function." 
Alth:>ugh only three years had elapsed, the 77 /78 
movement differed markedly from Malari. For the first 
time, the sb.Idents were clearly anti-militarist, ~ 
openly criticised Suharto and his family, even raising 
demands for his resignation. For Suharto am the army, 
this was going too far. sturent leaders on many campuses 
were roun<Ed up, many to face trial am heavy sentences. 
Unlike the KAMI rnovernenta decade earlier which was 
run by extra-camp.is organisations such as Catholic and 
Muslim sb.Jdent organisations, the 1974 and 1978 
movements were organised by campus-based sb.Ident 
councils (OM) and sb.Ident senates (SM). Another feab.lre 
in the seventies was the role of the student press. 
campis period:i.cal.s, leaflets and brochures were produced 
wltich have since beoome invaluable histodcal documents, 
containing analyses that are as valid today as th:!y ever 
were, especially regarding the nab.Ire of military rule. 
Although some 1978 leaders later sought survival 
through collaboration, few have found a place in Golkar 
or the bureaucracy, as their attacks on the First F amil Y 
proved unforgivable. 
Fran a 1978 stndanl: pamphlet: "'!be younger generat:ioo on 
trial." 
Curbing student protest 
The two upsurges, coming in such close prOKi.mity, 
convinced the regime that it was now time to strike at 
the very foundation of sb.Ident protest, once and for 
all. Even before the latter movement peaked, the 
Educatim Department iss\Ed Regulation 028 prohibiting 
sb.Idents from taking part in active politics and 
demonstrations. The ruling was ignored but a much 
greater blow was struck when Education Minister, Daud 
Yusuf, issued Regulation 0156 for "normalisation" of 
campus life, known as the NK K. The DMs am SMs were 
disbanded and replaced by new organisations that were 
part of the universicy bureaucratic strucb.lre. In 
addition, strict rules were .introduced regarding sb.ldy 
timetables, to ensure that sb.Idents would have no time 
"to busy themselves with extra-campus affairs". 
With their best leaders in prison, their councils 
banned and all student meetings oow needing permits, the 
sb.Idents were effectively depoliticised, so much so that 
it has taken the best part of a decade for student 
action to re-emerge. ___... 
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New stirrings 
A stndem: demoost:ration in Ujung Pandang, November 
1987. 
In November last year, many students and other young 
people in Ujung Pandang took to the streets in protest 
against a new ruling requiring motor-cyclists to wear 
helmets. The serurityforces responded with an iron fist 
and fourteen people were left dead. Although Ujung 
Pandang did not set the pattern for other protests, it 
was a clear sign that tempers on the campuses were near 
boiling point. 
To put the current wave of unrest into perspective, it 
should be explained that since the early 1970s, the 
students have regarded themselves not as a political 
force but as a moral force focussing on protest. The 
weakness of su::h a stand is that continuity cannot be 
guaranteed as no political programme is formulated. 
However, a 'purely moral' m01Tement has the advantage of 
being able to avoid political compromises. 
Like other third world CX>Untries, Indooesia is today a 
country of the young. Half the population is under 21 
years old, with urbanisation the big attraction for 
rural youth. Altmugh the number of schools has 
increased, tertiary institutions camiot absorb all the 
sch:>ol-leavers wishing to contirue their .education. Job 
opportunities have failed to keep up. A university 
degree or even a PhD is no longer a guarantee of 
employment. Problems facing students have mounted: the 
prospects of unemployment. high . tuition fees, 
incompetent lecturers, overcrowded classrooms and, 
exacerbating the tensions, no channels for students to 
express their discontent. 
With tens of thousands failing to get places in the 
much-coveted state universities, private universities 
have mushroomed, and they charge very high fees. Some 
are run like busiresses, with parents having to haggle 
over entrance fees which can be as high as $7,500, not 
to mention tl.lition fees. It is now becoming cheaper for 
the very rich to send their offspring to universities in 
California or Melboume. 
In the current stifling political atmosphere, student 
demarrls are focussed on campus issues. In the last ten 
months or so, demonstrations have taken place in 
Nommensen University, Medan: the National University 
(Unas), Jakarta: the arts academy, STK Wilwatika in 
Jogjakarta: the Muslim state institute, IAIN Antasari in 
Banjarmasin: Dipooegoro University, Semarang: the 
Acxx:utt:aocy and Banking Academy, Semarang: the teachers' 
college, !KIP-Veteran in Semarang: Satya Wacana 
Christian University, Salatiga: the Muhamaddiyah 
Universities in Surakart.a and Magelang: and the 
! STUDENT PROTESTS 
I 
IIXionesian Islamic University in Jogjakarta. The scale 
of protest has varied; sane have remaired within campus 
boutrlaries while others have made the national 
headlines. 
One of.the more remote e>ramples oomes from Banjarmasin 
where students, angered by a big increase in fees, tried 
in vain to speak to the Rector. A campus demonstraticn 
failed to get a hearing with the authorities, whereupon 
sevenhmdredstlldents marched to the Rector's lx>me and 
banged on his door. Not until the police chief 
intervened, urging the Rector to speak to the students, 
did tempers oool, such was the arrogance of the 
university leadership. 
At !KIP-Veteran in Semarang, students SUCX-"eeded in 
prevent:in;J the ag:ointment of two new deput¥ rectors who 
were unwelcane because they were also head and deputy-
head of the college foumation. 
A loog battle is taking place in Jakarta's National 
University (Unas), one of the oldest private 
universities. Three students have been suspended in a 
struggle to remove the 80-year-old Sutan Takdir 
Alisyahbana, a respected writer aoo philosopher with m 
fl.air for university management. The students have also 
called for more openness about prestige projects that 
are being financed at the expence of basic study 
facilities. Two hundred students have to ci:am into tiny 
lecture rooms while fourth and fifth year students are 
employed to team secooo am third years. But the Rector 
has refused to listen to the students. 
Things esca1atOO in May when campus para-militaries in 
Menwa, the student regiment. beat up an activist. The 
situation remain; dea:llocked while the Rector declared: 
"The task of students is to study and study: no need to 
interfere in the running of the university." [Panji 
Masyarakat, 1-10 June 1988) 
Atpresent, actionsremainisolated, the 1978 measures 
having fragmented the campuses. The student press, which 
in tmse days helped spread news of actioos, tuming 
local issues into natimal ones, was all outlawed and 
must now start again from scratch. But there have been 
signs of solidarity. After the Ujung Pandang killings, 
Bandung students went to Parliament to protest. 
Major-General Setyana, Central Java's military 
commander, well aware of the danger of. growing student 
protest. summoned the heads of all tertiary institutions 
in the province to warn them to be vigilant. He claimed 
that students from outside Central Java were visiting 
the campuses to exchange experiences. "These visits 
could lead to an escalation," he said [Tempo, 14 May). 
It fell to a former minister of religia.ls affairs, 
Professor Mukti Ali, now Re=tor of the State Islamic 
University, IAIN, to speak oot last year for the 
restoration of democratic rights. "The time has come for 
student representative bodies to be restored so that 
students can speak out. Students should not be silentr 
for silence is obIDXi.ous," Kompas, 27 February 1987). 
Needless to say, many highly_:-placed officials and 
former student activists disagree with such liberal 
views. Golkar Secretary-General Sarwooo, for one, has 
warned that if student action escalates, military groups 
will exploit tlem. Another, Yuwono Sudarsono, now a 
lecturer, who failed, with Jusuf Wanandi, to win a place 
oo the UN hlman rights sub-commission in Geneva earlier 
this year, alleges that "if activism gets out of hand, 
young officers oould team up with the students and form 
a reform mwement within the army. That is the real 
threat that the students present." [FEBR, 11 February 
1988). In the same article, an unnamed g01Ternment 
official called the students "red-diaper babies", the 
offspring of communists killed in the 1965 anti-
oommunist massacre, wlx> are now propelled by feelings of 
revenge. 
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But what do the student activists themselves think? 
Petrus Bans, a suspended Unas student has spoken up 
against financial swindles at the university, comparing 
them to ripoffs in the local market. Others decry the 
studmtorgans that have replaced the DMs and SMs which 
are described as simply an extension of the university 
managemerC. A st:l.rlentat tre Semarang Teachers Training 
College wh::> himself chairs one of these government-
sponsored organs, believes that their lack of 
effectiveness has prompted students to tnm to direct 
action. "All stndent representative bodies are defun~ 
not only here but everywhere," [Tempo, 14 May 1988). 
Bandung stndents, traditionally in the vanguard of the 
student movemen~ have been true to their reputation. A 
gI'Qlp named Satgas, or Kesatnan Tugas (United Task 
Force) was set up last year. (The choice of name is 
unfortunate as Satgas is also the name of special army 
RED DRIVE 
intelligence units.) The student Satgas hcpes to 
rekindle past traditions, forge links with students 
elsewhere and circulate its publications widely. "We 
have no oonnectioo with any political group or 
cppositim figures. we are only stndents interested in 
taking critical action to show the government we care 
about what they are doing. we are against N K K. We are 
against limitations on freedom." [FEB R, 11 February 
1988) 
It is too socn to predict where present developments 
will lead nor should oomparisons be made with student 
actkns i:i Salt:h Korea or Burma. There is still no focus 
on national issues; !OOonesian student activists must 
still consolidate themselves arouoo the most important 
issue on camp.IS, to oppose the dictatorial and anti.-
democratic NK K regulatioo. {c 
When your name is on a list 
"This was the most terrible thing that could possibly 
have happened. It was as if they had murdered me," said 
the grey--haired writer, lamenting his fate. He spcke :in 
a soft, unemotional voice, picking his words carefully. 
''I am not entitled to anything, not even my pensioo." 
The caise of the calamity was a letter he received 
from the Department of Educatioo and Culture on 24 May 
nd:ifying him that he had been dish::>norably dismissed as 
senior lecturer at the Faculty of Commmtl.catioos, 
Pajajaran Univers:ity, Bardung. This automatically meant 
he cruld no longer teach either at the Police Academy or 
at the Infantry's Centre of Education in BandlBlg. 
The dismissal followed a charge that he had ooce been 
a memberoftheoutlawedorganisatial, Lekra, the League 
of People's Culture. an organisation associated with the 
PKI. "I have no idea h::>w my name ever came to be on 
Lekra's lis~" he told Tempo. 
Let us call this father of four Sukresna. He joined 
the staff of Unpad in 1969. His dismissal notice was 
retrospective from 1 September last year. "This means 
that I must pay back the wages I have received for the 
lMt seven mooths." 
He realised that his name had ooce been connected with 
Lekra but thought that it had all been cleared up. ''I 
reported myself and asked to be screened. This all 
happened in 1965 and 1966, thI'Qlgh the military 
oommands, K oramil and K cxlim, tlu:OJ.gh the Police and the 
local cpvemment. Everything was cleared up and I was 
allowed to resume my studies." He graduated in 
oommunications studies in 1969. 
On the iillTitation of the Russian Writers Union, he 
ace visited Mosoow, and visited North Korea and China. 
On these trips, he travelled with the Jogjakarta writer, 
w.s. Rendra. He was amazed because he was constantly 
identified as the editor of Syntes 3, the journal of the 
pro-PKI stndents' organisation, CGMI. "This is h::>w the 
PKI dragged people down," he said. 
In 1965, two short novels of his, Api and Si Rangka, 
were banned because of the Lekra charge. He had no 
chance to challenge this, ro he oontinued to be regarded 
as a Lekra writer. Who now has plotted his downfall? 
He thinks the trouble started four years ago. He had 
been ordered to leave his home which was being taken 
over for a local government project. But because the 
lecturers' homes in Cigadung were not yet ready for use, 
he moved in to a house on Jalan Sekeloa. The Dean of the 
Faculty gave him two weeks to leave, but Sukresna 
refused to move, asking first to be allowed to oomplete 
various formalities. "Because of this, I came to be 
regarded as a rebel." 
There were many repercussions, and the conflict with 
the Faculty went on for ages. Sukresna came out the 
loser. Two years later, he was investigated by the 
Inspector-General of the Department on the Lekra 
questim. This time too, things were cleared up, but 
later on, he was again called to accoun~ this time by 
the West Java special Kopkamtib officer (Laksusda). 
Again, he emerged unscathed. ''I can ooly conclude that 
the letter I have now received from the Department of 
Education was sent at the prompting of the Faculty and 
has nothing to do with the Laksusda." 
Sukresna's dismissal came as a great shock to H.B. 
Jassin, the well-known literary critic and editor of 
Kisah, a journal which often publishes short stories by 
Kresna. "He's not a member of Lekra. He's not a 
oommunis~" insists Jassin. Jassin regards Kresna as a 
writer who was attracted by socialist realism, who 
speaks out for justice and humanitarianism. 
Some writers with views like this got taken on board 
by Lekra, oonsciously or unoonsciously. It's hard luck 
for those who never became members but whose names 
appear to have been included on the skipper's list. 
[Translated from Tempo, 16 July 1988.] 
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INTERVIEW 
Tintorese refugee on Indonesian operations 
in East Tinior since 1975 
Cristiano Cost.a lived with his parents in Baucau until the town was invaded blJ Indonesian troops two days after Dili was 
invaded on 7 December 1975. He fled to the mount.ains and spent the next three years in the bush. From 1979 till 1987, he 
lived in Indonesian-occupied Baubau, often in detention or in danger of arrest. In October 1987, he escaped from 
Indonesia while on a visit to Jak.art.a. After a brief stal} in Macao, he reached Lisbon in February this year and testified 
before the UN Human Rights Commission in March. This is the third and final part of an interview with him in Geneva. The 
first two parts appeared in TAPOL Bulletins No 86 and 87. 
weze you able to help anyone escape? 
Yes, but there were soldiers ahead of us and more 
soldiers behind us so jf we let anyooe 90, the soldiers 
behind could kill them. But some did escape. 
I had always imagined that durinq the fenoEH:lf-legs, 
Timorese were 1n the front line. 
No, soldiers were in the frontline, tlx:>ugh not all 
that many. They were 'gerak cepat' (rapid-moving) 
troops. In the next line were Timorese, put with 
Indcnesian soldiers as well. In the rear, there were 
only soldiers, combat tnx:ps. 
As they closed in on Aitana, they knew many Fretilin 
people were trapped there, from many parts of the 
count:Iy. So as the Uoe>ps closed in, the Timorese, the 
civilians, were told to go home, leaving only troops. My 
particular~, the ores who were armed, were not told 
to go home but were kept in the rear. 
How many of you were armed? 
There were four armed teams of Timorese as well as 
Timorese hansip (civil guards), and others called 
'partizan', also bearing weapons. The other Timorese 
were not armed. They just came along, carrying food, 
shouting and.yelling. Our team was called 'team loriku', 
that's the name of a bird. 
Bow did they select the ones to be armed? 
We were the ones who had been fighting in the bush so 
they knew we a::W.d handle weapcns. Of course, they were 
susp:ici..ous of us, but they needed a lot of people for 
the operation. 
When we surrendered in 1979, we were in the hands of 
Sahala Rajagukguk. He was CXlllmarrer of RTP (Regi.Jren Team 
Pertemµ.irari 6, Later, re became commander of the K orem, 
the District Military Command .in Olli. He knew all about 
us and decided that we should be armed. He was Korem 
commander at the time of the fence-of- legs. 
What alnlt the logistics of the operation? 
The operation cost the Indcnesians two billion rupiahs 
in addition to the regular wages and upkeep of the 
trocps. It was regarded as a special project. Food was 
carried alcng in vehicles, and later, when there were ro 
roads, it was dropped by helicq>ter. The Timorese had 
brooght some food with them. Those of us .in the special 
teams got our food from the military. I think the other 
Timorese were also supplied with some food, though it 
was far from enough, corn and things like that. 
In custody during the 1982 election 
What happened to you after that operation? 
I was basErl in Ostiko at the time, not in Baucau. 
After resting for a while, I went oome to my parents. 
Thenafew weeks before the 1982 general election, many 
of us were sert: to Tacitolu, a few kilometres west of 
Dill airfield and were held in custody. 
But a few months before, they had given you weapms. 
Yes, I never cease to wonder. We had been in 
Indcnesian hands for a lcng time, they had armed us to 
take part in the fence-of-legs. Yet when election time 
came, they didn't trust us so we were detained. 
Wh:> were the others? 
They were all people who had been fighting in the 
bush. People who had been in those special teams durinq 
the fence-of-legs. We were all detained in Tacitolu, as 
I recoll~ 121 from Baucau. There were about a h\D'ldred 
from Vikeke and a lot more from Los Palos. Altogether 
324 people were sent to Tacitolu from t:h:>se three 
places. Maybe, p~le from other places were taken 
elsewhere. I don't know. 
At me manent. they seem to trust you and give you arms. 
The next moment. they suspect you and put you in jail. 
Bow do you explain that? 
With difficulty! Theythemselves create the catditions 
to make everyone hate them. Even people who want to 
support them find it difficult. They have such a bad 
attib.de towards the Timorese. Whatever peq:>le do for 
the Irdcnesians, they continue to hate them, incltding 
those who are not in contact with Fretilin. The 
Indonesians are so inhuman. 
How long were you in Tacitolu? 
Three mcnths. We weren't in prison but we weren't 
allowed outside the area. We weren't interrogated but 
they gave us indoctrination, penataran, about the 
• 
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INTERVIEW 
What happened tx> the flag? 
One Indaedan project in Dill that was surely built tX> 
last is the lnt2gratial Mooument. But a recent photx> in 
IC. om pas J:e\Teals that the warrior on top has lost his md-
and-white fl.aq. Did someone climb up one night and 
remove it. or is it a sign of providence? 
Pancasila or whatever. Every time we wanted tx:> go 
anywhere, we ha:l to get permission. Some were allowed to 
go and see their families in Dili but only for the day. 
I suppa;ed you'd call this 'quarantine', making sure 
we didn't influence anyone during the elections. They 
kept us there Wl aboot six weeks after the election. 
Do you koow anythinq about the 1982 elections? 
No, we didn't see anything. They didn't want anyone 
arwnd who might disturb things. I ~r this happened 
elsewhere too, in West Papua for instance. 
Indonesia's most murderous officer 
What's your opinioo of Sahala Rajagukguk? 
Of all the Ind:mesian cfficers woo have served in East 
Timor, re's the worst murderer. During his term in East 
Timor, many people were munlered. Many F reWin peq>le 
woo were captured at the time disappeared. I reckon that 
at least a hundred people disappeared durlng the time he 
was commander of RTP-6, from 1979 tX> 1980, and then 
Korem commarder up to 1982. Some of the names of the 
disappeared were mentioned in a copy of TA POL Bulletin 
that I saw - Leopolc:b, Joaquim, Maria Goretti, Anni 
Baldera Wujo, Juia Inacio. About 80 per cent of the 
Fretilln guerrillas captured during his term were 
mu mered. 
What about Colonel Purwanto, woo replaced Sabala? 
I don't rerollect hearing anything about him before he 
became commarxJer. As far as I can remember, he took over 
at the beginning of 1983, just before the negotiati.Ons 
with Xanana took place. 
I think his intentions towards East Timor were good. 
He wanted to resolve the oonflict. by diplomacy, not by 
violence. His intentions were the reverse of Saha.la's. 
but the problem was, there was no meeting-point between 
the two sides. So the whole thing collapsed. Both sides 
really made an effort to resolve the ronflict. 
Doomed to failure 
Inci::nesia'satrempts to crush Fretilin and impose East 
Timor's integration by force caIUlOt succeed. In 1975, 
they tried to impose integration by diplomacy with the 
Portllguese, but that failed. Then came their campaign to 
integrate East Timor in 1975 with Operas! Komcxlo, 
laurdaifrom WestTimorurrer Benny Murdani's command. 
Trell came Operasi~ launched on 7 December 1975 to 
take rontrol of D~ Baocau and Los Palos, commanded by 
Dading Kalbuadi. NeKtcame the operation to take ccntrol 
of the district towns, but this was unsuccessful too. 
Fretilinsetup shock brigcdes to launch counte:r-attacks 
against Inchnesian positioos in the towns. Then the 
Indooesians launched a new strategy with Operasi Sapu 
Bersih, which succeeded in destroying vi.rtllally 90 per 
cent of F retilin forces, with many being captured. 
surrendering or being killed. 
With this cperaticn, muchofinchnesia's objective was 
achieved. Many people were arrested, many F reWin 
members surren:Ered. There was virtually no resistance 
left. Then followed a wave of killings, under Sahala 
Rajagukguk. This was woon Xanana emerged as the person 
who found the way forward in the bush. He and Mau Humi, 
the cnly other Fretilin central committee member to 
SUIVive Opei:asi Sap.1 ~ re-organised F retilin. From 
1 - 3 March 1981, during Sahala's time, they convened a 
ronference in the central sector, in Bamilita, at the 
foot of Mot.mt Maubai. Indonesia was very afraid of 
Fretilin's resurgence so they launched a new strategy 
with the fence-of-legs, their fourth operation, after 
all their previous operations had failed to smash the 
resistance. But this operation did not succeed either. 
Then came operasi kik.is in 1983. This followed the 
Fretilin offensive in K raras which I spoke about 
earlier. Many people were arrested at the time, 
including me. They used about forty battalims in this 
operation. It continued throughoot 1984 am into 1985. 
But this was yet another failure. Fretilin suffered 
virtually no losses but there were many Iooonesian 
casualties. Fretilin's position became stronger than in 
1982, with many more weapons, thanks to the militia who 
joined their ranks, brlnging their weapons with them. 
Was it mly militia from Krakas woo joined F:retilin in 
1983? 
More than two hurrlred armed militia in K rakas went 
into the bush along with almost everycne in K raras. 
Other militia went into the bush from Buanura. From 
Uaili.1.i, a kampung a few kilometres to the south of 
Baucau, about ten hansip members fled to the bush, 
taking their weapons. Other went from Los Palos. This 
had been well coordinated during the ceasefire after the 
necptiations in Marchl983. This was when Benny Murdani 
took CNer as armed forces rommande:r-in-chief and soon 
switched back to the strategy of relying only on force. 
Th.is was when the special commarrl for East Timor known 
as Koa;pkam was set up, because East Timor is a special 
operations region. 
The kikis operation was a continuation of the fence-
of-legs, but this time, only military forces were 
de~ The flrstcx:rnmarrerof KooFSkam was Brigadier-
G ene:ml SUgito. There were many arrests in the towns. 
.... 
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F reti.lin gains in strength 
But by this time, Fretilin had become ver:y experienced 
and was firmly established as a resistance movement. 
People say they have five or six lu1ndred armed 
guerrillas. During the feoc-e-af-legs, Incbnesia captured 
127 firearms. I kn::>w, because I was working with them at 
the time and saw the documents. But in 1983, Fretilin 
obtained an addi.ti.Cl'lal. blo hundred weapons, making them 
stronger than before. But I dent believe there are only 
five hundred armed guerrillas. From 1980 to 1983, I was 
able to follow the siblatioo closely because I was 
working with In<knesian intelligence. I am certain there 
are more than five hunired armed guerrillas. 
I am talking about armed personnel. Altogether there 
are at least a thoosand guerrillas, of w oom at least 
five h.mdred are armed. Five hundred sourrls like a small 
number but for a country the size of East Timor, it's 
not small. A guerrilla movement with five hundred armed 
personnel, with rich experiences going back thirteen 
years, cannot be regarded as trivial. East Timor is a 
INTERVIEW j 
small coontry with a pq:>ulatia'l of about 600,000 peq:>le. 
No-one, least of all the Irrlonesians, can afford to 
under-estimate such a movement. 
Finally oould you say something about Fretilin's 
military strategy? 
There are two basic points. Firstly, waging mobile 
warfare, with guerrillas operating in small, mobile 
groups througoout the interior. This is combined with a 
system of tactical offensive which means that groups 
launch diversionar:y attacks against a number of 
Indmesian positions in different parts of the country, 
on this or that town, sometimes simaltaneously. The 
<JlErrlllas are extremely sparing with their firearms and 
ammunitioo; they only fire when they are sure of their 
targe~ of getting an Irrlonesian soldier and, if 
possible, capturing a weapoo, several weapoos and some 
ammunition. These tactics continually replenish Fretilin 
forces, while causing Irrlcnesian casualties and creating 
a sense of insecurity on the enemy side. ~ 
WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES 
West Papuans expelled from Vanuatu 
The government of Father Walter Lini has ordered all 
West Papuans who were living in Vanuatu to leave the 
country, alleging that they had been involved in a 
political conflict involving a former minister, Barak 
Sope. But Father Lini has made it clear, in a press 
statemen~ that his "Government's support for the 
indeperrlED:e of West Pap.ia remains firm and is in no way 
affected by the recent events. The Vanuatu Government is 
the only government in the world which officially 
supports West Papuan independence." . 
When the deportaticn order was served on 6 June, the 
OPM representative in Vanuatu, Rex Rumakiek, was in 
Australia, and has since been seeking to obtain 
permission to remain in Australia. Five other West 
Papuans in Port Vila are members of the Black Brothers 
band who, with their relatives, have been unable to 
leave because they have no place to go and no means to 
get anywhere. Because they were unable to comply with 
the deportation order, they were placed in derention on 
14 June. Toose arrestai are Andi A yamiseba, his younger 
brother William, Stevie Marnbor, August Rumwarcpen and 
Eti Ayamiseba. Otrers named on the deportation order are 
Andi Ayamiseba Senior, Leila Ayamiseba and her two 
daughters Iscd:>ra arrl Doli:mna, band member Benny Bettay 
Tai\ his wife and their two children Dickie and Jill, 
Mrs Rumwaropen arrl her daughters Leah, Ros and Petra, 
arrl William Ayamiseba's wife, Emily, a Solomon Islander. 
The Black Brothers is a West Papuan pep groop which 
was very popular in Indonesia right up to the time the 
whole groop defected. 
AOO:i. Ayarniseba Senior holds a Dutch passport but the 
others hold only Dutch alien travel documents. The 
members of tie Black Brothers band sought asylum in 
Holland after being forced to leave Papua New Guinea in 
1980, under pressure from Jakarta. 
In 1983, the then Vanuatu Immigration Minister, Barak 
Sope helped the group to enter and settle in Vanuatu as 
his personal friends and business associates. They had 
no formal status as refugees. When. a conflict flared up 
between Sepe and Prime Minister Lini, they lost their 
protection. But having left the Netherlands, they had 
forfeited their right of residence in that cruntry. 
They are now seeking permission to enter Australia. 
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WEST PAPUA 
Transmigration site attack clarified 
From several sources, TAPOl. has been able to piece together a much fuller picture of the incident at an Arso 
transmigration site in March this year when a number oftransmigrants were killedand many more were injured. We reported 
this incident in TA POL Bulletin, No 87, June 1988. We publish the following as a comprehensive correction of that :report: 
It was not in fact an attack from people outside the 
site. It was an attack on a grrup of transmigrants from 
Sulawesi by local transmigrants. The site in questicn 
includes one large rioe-growllY:1 area where she thousand 
Javanese now live and work. In addition there is a PIR 
(nucleus estate) site where palm-oil trees were planted 
about seven years ago. Some inhabitants in the rice-
growllY:1 area am frcm Sulawesi. They are not government-
sponsored transmigrants but acquired the land they now 
oca.ipy indeperrlently. They are SJ;X>ntana>us or 'swakarsa' 
transmigrants. 
In addition, there are about five hundred Arso 
villagers on the site. In the early 1970s, following 
conflicts with Indonesian troops, the villagers fled to 
Papua New Guinea. They ret:urred several years later to 
find that their villages had been destroyed. They were 
told to build themselves a new village and their sago 
stanis were cut down. Their village became part of a 
transmigraticn site. They had no option but to agree to 
become local settlers en what had formerly been their 
own land. With their sago starrls and other food supplies 
gone, they became totally deperrlent on what they could 
earn as PIR labourers. 
The positicn of the Arso people on the site is 
inferior to the Sulawesi families living nearby, 
somewhat akin to coolie laboor tending the plantation 
crops. In any case, economic corrlitic:ns on the site are 
difficult because, even though palm-oil is now being 
produced, there is ro factory to process the oil. Being 
at the bottom of the pile, Arso villagers have been 
particularly badly hit. 
It was out of a sense of frustration at their loss of 
land, their impoverished circumstances and the way the 
newcomers from Sulawesi. treated them that led to an 
outburst of fury, in the form of an attack by a number 
of Arso villagers armed with machetes. 
Our sources insist that the OPM was not involved in 
any way. Irvleed, following the attack, OPM fighters in 
the area made it clear that it was no part of their 
strategy to attack transmigrants. This reinforces the 
statementissteibySeth Rumkorem, the OPM leader who is 
now a refugee in Athens, insisting that none of the OPM 
actims he had been informed about recently was related 
to transmigrants. But his assessment that the incident 
was inspired by army intelligence is not substantiated, 
t:OOugh it does appear that, once the incident had 
cx::rurred and a number of transmigrants (eleven according 
to air sa.irces) had been killed, the army used it as a 
pretext to launch operations against the OPM. 
Later claims by OPM spokespersons alleging their own 
involvement arrl even speaking of a death toll exceeding 
150 people are, we have been assured, quite without 
fourrlation. 1f 
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A transmigration site in West Papua 
Bemani Narokobi appointed Justice Minister 
Bemai:tl Narokob~ the Pap.ia New Guinean lawyer who 
has done so much to protect the rights of West 
Papuan refugees seeking asylum in PNG from 
persecution by the Incbnesian auth:>rities, has been 
named Minister of Justice in the new government just 
formed in Port Moresby by Rabbie Namaliu, leader of 
the Pangu Party. 
The new c.;premment was funned after the qovemment 
of Paias Wingti lost a confidence motion in 
Parliament. The government is a coalition of the 
Pangu Parcy, the Melanesian Alliance whose leader is 
Father Jchn Momis, and the People's Action Party, 
led by Ted Diro, :f.brmer canmaroer of the P NG Defence 
Force who is known to be close to Incbnesia's 
General Murdani. Michael Somare, the former leader 
of Pangu, who was Prime Minister when twelve West 
Papuans were deported to Irronesia in October 1985, 
hasbeennamedas Foreign Minister. John Giheno also 
of Pangu, has been appointed Minister of State to 
assist the Prime Minister. Giheno was the Foreign 
Minister who signed the deportation warrants of the 
twelve West Papuans. 
TAPOL has written to the new Minister af Justice 
e.xpressing the hope that the interest of the 
refugees will be safe in his hands. 
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Swiss pilot exposes missionary 
activity in West Papua 
Treodore Frey, the Swiss pilot who, together with his 
wife and daughter, made a very risky escape from West 
Papua in May this year, has strongly criticised Catholic 
missk>nary aviaticn serv:ices in West Papua for assisting 
the Indonesian military in their efforts to control and 
exterminate the native people of the territory. 
The Frey family arrive:l in Nhulunbuy, the northern-
most tip of Australia, aboard a Cessna plane with the 
fuel tank almost empty, having left Nabire without their 
passp:>rt:s, and in a desperate hurry [TAPOL Bulletin, No 
87, June 1988]. Frey had been employed by Associated 
Mission Aviation (AMA), the Cath:>lic aviation company. 
Open letter to the Pope 
In an open letter to the Pope, Frey bitterly has 
attacked the Catholic missionaries in West Papua for 
their oomplicity in Indonesia's campaign of genocide of 
the pecple of West Papua. In particular, he romplained 
that the role of the missionaries in West Papua is to 
penetrate places that have never been reached by 
outsiders. They then convince the Papuans who are still 
living a semi-nomadic e.x:i.stalce to settle. "Missimaries 
are the only people suitable for this kind of activity 
since an mdisclosed number of Incbnesian civil servants 
and military persoonel have gene into the bush, never to 
return." 
Thecxbre Frey 
The creation c£ permanent settlements inflicts untold 
ecological disaster on the tropical forest, the letter 
continues. A system of settlement that has existed for 
40,000 years cannot be uprooted in a few years without 
causing an eoological catastrophe. "Tropical sail with a 
humus only 5 centimeters deep cannot tolerate clearance 
of the area. The topsoil is washed away and disappears, 
leaving the people with:>ut food and resources." 
"Once a missk>n's permanent settlements have grown to 
a certain size, the Papuans are required to build an 
airstrip .... The Papuans are required to surrender part 
of their ancestral land and to do heavy labour, in 
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exchange for which their environment and life-style are 
destroyed and they become dependent upon a murderous 
system." The letter continues: 
"Once people have settled ramd an airstrip, have been 
civilised and wear clothes, a military post is built. 
Mission pilots are obliged to fly the church~wned 
planes to transport all the material and personnel into 
the area in question. The priests who are in charge of 
radio oommunications coonlinate the flights for the 
military and relay weather forecasts. In 1967, the 
number of flights for mission work was 82 per cent but 
in the past few years, this has droppe:l to well below 50 
per cent." 
The letter also comments on the mission's role in 
supporting transmigration. "The missionaries relp the 
state to make cart:act with the indigenous people and 
later on, officials expropriate land or purchase it in 
exchange for a few worthless gifts. Subsequently, 
Missk>n aviation takes char9=! of the new transmigration 
camp as no roads exist, (and) is required to harrlle all 
military flights, s:lnce tre camps have been built as 
defence villages, serving to protect vital installations 
such as the borrer, the copper-mine, ail fields or major 
towns." 
Frey also revealed that AMA is planning to buy new, 
larger aircraft.. "Although they koow this will mean 
having to fly three times as many flights for the 
military, Bishop Munnink.hof of Jayapura told me, in a 
private conversation: 'If we oon't do it, others will.'" 
Documents show increased support 
for the military 
While in The Hagre :In June to take part in a protest 
against the internatimal meeting of western doo.or 
countries, the Frey family spoke to the Dutch press. 
Trey reveale:l that during the six months they spel'E in 
... 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 88, August 1988 23 
WEST PAPUA 
West Papua, Frey had access to documents containing 
figures recording Mission flights over many years. He 
became aware of the extent to which missioo aviatial is 
utilised by the Indonesians, in partia.llar the military. 
Apart from AMA, the Catholic aviation company, the 
Protestants run Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAP) and 
the Summer Instib.rte of Linguistics (SIL) also run an 
aviation sezvice. Together, they use about three hmidred 
airstrips. Most are sitllated in regions accessible only 
by jungle footpaths, so the airstrips are the only link 
with the outside world. Indones:j.an officials are 
entirely dependent on Mission aircraft for keeping 
contact with posts set up close to the airstrips. 
When he oomplained to the four Catholic bish:>ps in 
West Papua abrut this abuse of Mission ~vity, he was 
told that if the Missions refused to make flights for 
the military, they would not be allowed to remain in 
West Papua. "Even if only 18 per cent of oor flights are 
for the Mission, we are still helping the pecple," the 
bishcps said. ·~ we were thrown out, we would not be 
able to do even this. We cannot accept that." 
Becoming an OPM suspect 
As for Frey himself, he was oompelled to fly many 
missions for the army, but when he declared on one 
occasion that he was not willing to undertake a flight 
the next morning for the military, he soon realised that 
he had becane a suspect, a victim of the Indonesian view 
that "who is not with us is against us, am who is 
against us must be part of the OPM". 
He became afraid for his life when he disoovered that 
there had been an attempt to tamper with a plane he was 
about to fly. Soon after, he overheard two Inchnesians 
plotting to get rid of him so he and his family took the 
decision to escape immediately to the 'free world', to 
Nhulunbuy in northern Australia. 
After the family arrived back safely in Switzerland, 
the chcument he had studied about flight activity foond 
its way to Europe and is now in the hards of the west 
Papuan People's FI01t whidl is based in the Netherlams. 
The Front has since studied the documents and found, 
among other things, a direct co-relaticn between 
periodic upsurges in the number of flights for the 
military am the intensification of military operations 
in 1969, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1984. [De Waa.the:id, 18 
Jmie 1988.J 
What our readers can do 
Theo Fxey has asked us to request our readers to write 
to the three mission aviation companies in West Papua, 
urging them not allow the Indonesian military to use 
their aircraft. He believes that this woold convince 
missionary associations that their reprehensible 
activities are being watched world-wide. 
The three companies are: 
Associated Mission Aviation 
Mission Aviation Fellowship 
Summer Institllte of Liguistics 
The addresses of all three are: 
Sentani. 
Irl.an Jaya, 
InOOnesia 
West Papuan refugees in warastone 
refuse to move 
More thcn two hmdred west Papuan refugees who are now 
living near warastx:ne beach, close to Vanimo, in West 
Sepik PI'Ollin::e, have refused to mo.re to East Awin which 
has been designated as the camp to acxommodate all West 
Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea. 
These refugee families are from Biak and Serui. They 
were originally living in Blackwater camp but decided to 
leave the camp several years ago and set themselves up 
on the beach at Warastone. All the Blackwater camp 
~es were airlifted to East Awin early in May. 
Several weeks Jat:er, t:te UN High Commission for Refugees 
representative in Port Moresby and the P NG Government 
asked the refugees in Warastone to move as well, but 
they have refused to oo so. No efforts have been made to 
force them to move. 
According to the UNHCR representative, they will 
contirlle to be treated as refugees mitil the government 
decides what to Cb. It is government policy not to allow 
any refugees to remain outside the camps specially 
designated for them. If this is applied in the case of 
the west Papuans in w arastone, it C'Ollld result in their 
losing the food and other aid they have been receiving 
lllltil now from the UNHCR. [Post Courier, 8 Jmie 1988) 
There are fears that the new Foreign Minister, Michael 
Somare, may decide to take action against them, cnce he 
has settled in to his new job. -{(. 
Villagers sue Conoco oil company 
Villagers from twelve villages in the vicinity of 
Sorong, West Papua have initiated proceedings in court 
to sue Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil oompany, and 
CoIDCO, the US oil company, for destroying more than 
900,000 sago trees. The destruction ocrurred when the 
companies were engage in exploration for oil back in 
1979. The ama.mtof compensation beirl} sought runs into 
billions of rupiahs. 
Apart from a single item in Jakarta Post of 24 Jlllle 
1988, which quotes Merdeka, and reports very briefly 
about the first court hearing, we have not seen any 
other press reports about this Valliant attempt, the 
first of its kind as far as we know, by villagers to 
force companies to oompensate them for the enormous 
damage inflicted on their soun::es of livelihood. * 
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